No agreement reached on Good Friday


English language reports on the Good Friday negotiations

Wednesday, 31 March, 1999

Friday 2nd April 1999

Saturday, April 3, 1999

Sunday 4th of April 99

Easter Sunday/Monday, 4/5 April, 1999


Wednesday, 31 March, 1999
Analysis: The real aim of the agreement
By John Waters (from the Irish Times)

If the Northern conflict was a simple matter of criminality there would, perhaps, be no cause for quarrel with what has occurred since last Good Friday. If, for example, the authorities had been dealing with a case of hostage-taking, and the negotiating process had followed similar lines, most people would regard the tactics employed by the Ulster Unionist Party and the British and Irish governments as legitimate responses to uncomplicated lawlessness.

Suppose the hostage-takers, having seized their prisoners, had entered into talks in which their demands for, say, the release of political prisoners had ostensibly been conceded. But, once the villains released their captives, the authorities had reneged, refusing to discuss things further until the kidnappers agreed to give themselves up. Most people, on hearing such news, would smile quietly at the cunning of the authorities and decide that public safety was in good hands.

This is more or less what has happened since last Good Friday.

To perceive this, it is necessary to look beyond the events of the past year to the long-standing attitudes and motivation of those who have been the main influences in the drift of such events. It is clear now that certainly the UUP, probably the British government, and possibly also the Irish Government, saw the Belfast Agreement as an opportunity to move Irish republicans beyond a line which they could not re-cross. It is clear also that large sections of the media in both Britain and Ireland - but especially in the Republic - saw things in much the same way.

In other words, hype notwithstanding, there was no „South African moment“ but, rather, a cleverly constructed trap to catch republicanism offside. If reality had lived up to the rhetoric, we would by now have crossed into a new reality, in which past enemies would have put their differences behind them and set about building a peaceful future on the foundations of the resulting trust.

But for this to occur it would have been necessary for those involved to share responsibility, to accept that the conflict had involved wrongdoing on all sides - including that of alleged authority.

This fundamental element was missing from the mix. At no time has the British government offered more than the most mealy-mouthed acknowledgment of even the more appalling excesses of British involvement in Ireland. At no time has David Trimble made even a token acknowledgment of the history of sectarianism and uncivilised behaviour that was unionist rule.

At all times, the view of virtually everyone outside the republican enclaves was that the central problem in the conflict was the IRA, an analysis fully supported by the Southern media. The only breakthrough in 30 years occurred when one man, John Hume, reached across the constitutional border, implicitly querying this view.

And what is perhaps most worrying about the present moment is that the Irish Government, under Bertie Ahern, appears to have regressed to a pre-Albert Reynolds analysis of the problem, implicitly accepting the British and unionist view that the primary problem is the IRA and its weaponry.

So, whereas republicans and large numbers of the electorates North and South entered into the spirit of Good Friday 1998 in the belief that at last there was some minimal acknowledgment of the true nature of the conflict, it is clear that most of those with real influence entered the exercise in a different frame of mind.

It is becoming clear also that, although the general public euphoria of last April was genuinely to do with a belief that a South African moment had been achieved, the satisfaction of the two governments and the Ulster Unionists was to do with a belief that republicans had finally been persuaded into the parlour, to be neutralised.

There were many clues to this reality had we chosen to observe them.  For example, the censorious response to the appearance of the Balcombe Street Four and other IRA prisoners at the Sinn Fein Ardfheis last May might have told us that few outside republican circles accepted that a new consciousness was necessary, let alone that it had been achieved. The thrust of the response was that it was unseemly for convicted criminals to be feted in such a „triumphalist“ manner at a political gathering.

But if we really believed in what we had been told had occurred in Belfast on Good Friday, we should at least have been able to extend to republicanism the right to perceive the conflict according to its own lights and perspectives and take the same satisfaction in its achievement as its opponents. We had the right to be displeased at what might have been considered indifference to the sensitivities of IRA victims, but we no longer had the right to say that these men and women were simple criminals, because two sovereign governments and all those who had put their names to the agreement had conceded that they were not.

The very existence of the agreement therefore implies that this conflict was never a simple issue of criminality. And just over a week ago, with the murder of Rosemary Nelson, we had a tragic but timely reminder of this reality. The attitude of authorities and opinion-formers North and South has never been confined to condemning the IRA, but is rather founded on the belief that, really, nationalists do not have the kind of grievance against the Northern state that could not have been dealt with by constitutional means.

In 30 years of episodes similar to the Nelson murder, those in authority have shown little capacity to see such events - when they condescended to see them at all - as other than minor aberrations, thus conspiring to avoid the most central reality: that Northern Ireland is a quasi-fascist statelet policed by a standing army loyal to one community.

Why do we call it a „peace process“ if we are not prepared to admit that there has been a war? If there has not been a war, why are prisoners being released? Why is the RUC under review? And if there has been a war, why do those in authority have such difficulty in carrying the logic of conflict-resolution to its necessary conclusion? These, rather than the continuing, dangerous nonsense about decommissioning, are the questions that should be focused on right now.

The decommissioning issue itself is emblematic of the broader difficulty, because to call for a handing in of IRA weapons without acknowledging that this is just one element in a bigger picture implies that republicans are especially lawless and particularly untrustworthy and, therefore, unworthy of association with a solemn peace agreement on their word alone. Until the present attitudes of those in authority changes, there is no hope of a true breakthrough.


Friday 2nd April 1999
Intellectual Infants
Anderstown News. Fr Des Wilson

Whatever the outcome of present negotiations, we have learned lessons. One is that any future agreements with unionists must have severe built-in penalties for non-compliance.Without penalties they will not keep any agreements they make. If any of us believed the myths they made about themselves - about the direct-speaking Ulsterman, whose word was his bond and whose bond could be trusted, all that illusion is shattered.

For those who were not so naive, the present revelation of unionists as people who never had to make agreements and therefore have not the techniques of keeping them, shows how right they were.  The myths about their dependability lasted a long time. But the unionist regime has destroyed trust, among its other atrocities. We must now make sure that every promise, however small,whether made by unionists as a whole or individually, shall be examined with a microscope to see the flaws. To see how they could get out of their obligations. To see how many cheatings can take place.  For those who believed better of them - and many of us have been trying for maybe half a lifetime to think generously of them - well now we know.

No agreement in future without the strictest drafting and the most severe penalties for cheating on it.The issue of ‘decommissioning’ should not even have to be discussed.It is irrelevant.

We have a right to be in government, just as others have, and others have an obligation to keep the agreements they made. If they did not want to keep their agreements they should not have made them.  Surely the European courts must some day pronounce on all this.  International agreements made and then broken by a rump party, a minority in Ireland, a minority in Europe, a minority everywhere. A party led by a man who has his position as first minister in waiting because democratic nationalists and republicans have agreed to him having it - who forgets perhaps that he owes his position not to a caucus of religious marchers in the Unionist Council but to the consent of democrats. Mr Trimble is first minister in waiting because republicans and nationalists have said he may. Surely it is time for us to withdraw that mandate if he does not keep agreements? Or are we to forget to use the little power we have?  Can anyone ever find out what hold the British unionist minority in Ireland has over British administrations and over Dublin governments?  What on earth is it? How can a small minority hold a majority to ransom? We have never had a satisfactory answer to these questions.

So much government kow-towing and so much humming and hawing and so much, God save the mark, touching of forelocks by governments to people who crippled our economy, created conditions for a revolution and refused even to talk about democratic rule let alone put it into practice because they thought what they had was democracy when every sane person knew it wasn’t. Patience.  Patience. Patience. You are dealing with intellectual infants who can turn violent at the first refusal. But a first refusal there has to be,and a second and a third. So whatever the outcome of the present political negotiations, let us remember the lessons. Never make an agreement again unless every sentence is fastened tightly with penalties for non-compliance.


Saturday, April 3, 1999
Impasse remains - Adams
Sinn Féin Press Office

Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams MP speaking this afternoon in Belfast said: „The fact that the Hillsborough talks ended in an adjournment means that there was no agreement - no deal. that is a matter of disappointment. good work was done but the institutions are still blocked and the Agreement is stalled. It will take a huge effort to shift it.

Mr. Adams said:
„People are trying to understand the different signals coming at the conclusion of the Hillsborough talks, and the different pronouncements of the parties involved, could be forgiven for thinking the declaration was a ‘done deal‘, agreed by all of the participants to the discussions. Such confusion is unhelpful. Clarity is what is required. The Taoiseach and the British Prime Minister made it clear that the declaration was not an agreement between the parties but was a draft position between the two governments.

„The impasse remains, the institutions are blocked and the Agreement is stalled. Sinn Féin‘s position is very clear, and I spelt it out again privately during this weeks discussions and publicly at the adjournment. Any resolution of these difficulties has to be within the context of the Agreement. Sinn Féin have also made it clear, both privately and publicly, that we cannot deliver the demand for IRA weapons, no matter how this is presented.

„Despite these difficulties Sinn Féin will return to the renewed discussions in two weeks determined to see the full implementation of the Agreement.“


Saturday, April 3, 1999
Up in arms over decommissioning
Irish News, Michael O’Toole

Solving the illegal arms question is, literally, a minefield that has been bedevilling the two governments since the first IRA ceasefire. Michael O’Toole looks at the background.

NEARLY five years after the Provisional IRA’s August 1994 cessation, there still seems to be no sign that either the governments or the parties to the Good Friday agreement have managed to crack the nut that threatens to derail the entire process.

With less than two days gone since the Hillsborough declaration, nationalist and republican sources have painted an increasingly pessimistic picture.

That is despite the fact three scenarios for a possible successful resolution of the decommissioning impasse emerged yesterday.

They are: surrender, destruction or verification ­ but only the final one has any hope of being accepted by the IRA leadership or rank-and-file members.

The first option is the one that unionists have been demanding since August 1994 ­ that the IRA hands over its haul of weapons and explosives.

This has been repeatedly ruled out by the IRA and there is no prospect of it being achieved.

But if the paramilitary group does decide to carry out the first option there would certainly be a split within the organisation.

Last month, the Irish News reported that elements of the south Armagh IRA had explicitly told the leadership they would leave the organisation if a single bullet was handed over, and it subsequently emerged that the split would not be confined there, with volunteers from all over Ireland quitting.

Both security sources and republican figures have also repeatedly said the organisation could not survive the handing in of arms.

The view from the republican community is that handing in arms would be tantamount to surrender ­ and they point out that no other paramilitary group in modern Irish history has ever given up its guns.

They also use the Bombay Street argument.

They point out that the IRA would need its weapons to defend Catholic or nationalist areas if another 1969 situation erupts.

Then, Catholics were forced from their homes in Belfast by loyalist crowds. Bombay Street in west Belfast, was one of the worst-hit areas.

IRA activists are haunted by the fact that in 1969 the organisation had no arms to defend Catholic areas and are determined not to let it happen again.

And because they consider the IRA an army, they ask what is the point of an army without guns?

Handing in weapons would in effect mean the end of the IRA, they say.

Self destruction also appears to be a non runner, for the exact same reason.

There has also been some recent speculation that one possible way forward was for the IRA ­ and other paramilitary groupings ­ to destroy their own weapons.

One scenario mooted was for the independent arms decommissioning body, headed by Canadian General John de Chastelain, to go to a prearranged spot.

There, they would see ­ and hear ­ a massive explosion which would see stocks of Semtex and guns destroyed by their owners.

The argument is that nothing would have to be surrendered.But, again, this option is seen as totally unacceptable to the republican movement.

Their reasons for rejecting it are broadly the same as the veto on handing in material: it would be viewed by most IRA personnel as tantamount to surrender.

But the middle way of verification has emerged as the only achievable way of solving the decommissioning impasse.

Last October, the Irish News revealed that the SDLP had put a position paper to the Irish government which it hoped could solve the problem.

The paper was written by party executive member Brian Heading, who studied international relations at university.

He suggested that instead of having to destroy or surrender weapons, the paramilitaries could cooperate with General de Chastelain, who could declare the material had been put out of commission.

One scenario is for the paramilitaries to show the general dumps containing arms.

But crucially, the ammunition would have been taken out and placed in another dump ­ rendering the guns sophisticated clubs.

The general ­ and the rest of his commission ­ would then have free reign to seal the dumps and to have access to them at any time to ensure the guns had not been used.

Both unionists and republicans have hinted this may be the way forward ­ that’s why the UUP has started to say it wants “verifiable decommissioning” and was not interested in surrender.

It just might be the way out. But even this option is filled with dangers.

There would be fears that the weapons could fall into the hands of criminals, or that dissident republicans could get their hands on them.

And, of course, if another Bombay Street did occur, this version of decommissioning would leave the door open for the the IRA to bring a new word into Irish politics: recommissioning.


Sunday 4th of April 99
Adams insists SF cannot deliver decommissioning
Irish Times

Republican sources were yesterday dismissive of the line in the declaration stating that decommissioning was an obligation rather than a precondition.

„There is talk in the declaration of a voluntary obligation. How can you have a voluntary obligation? It is still a precondition,“ said one source.

A clearer reading of the general republican reaction to the British-Irish proposals on decommissioning will be available over today and tomorrow when senior republicans address Easter commemorations throughout Ireland. Political observers will be paying particular attention to the speeches tomorrow of senior republicans such as Mr Adams, Mr Martin McGuinness, Mr Pat Doherty, Mr Gerry Kelly and Mr Martin Ferris respectively in Dublin, Derry, Dundalk, Sligo and Kerry.

An earlier indication of the general republican viewpoint should also be evident at Inniskeen, Co Monaghan, this afternoon where a leading republican, Mr Brian Keenan, will be the speaker. A Sinn Féin spokesman said such speeches would be a „preliminary“ view of the republican response to the Hillsborough declaration.

The response from Mr Adams yesterday will have left the British and Irish governments in no doubt that republicans are extremely unhappy with the declaration. „The impasse remains, the institutions are blocked and the agreement is stalled,“ he said. „It will take a huge effort to shift it.“

Most worrying for the governments will be his comment: „Sinn Féin has also made it clear, both privately and publicly, that we cannot deliver the demand for IRA weapons, no matter how this is presented.“ Mr Adams stressed that the declaration was a „working draft“ and that there was „no deal“ at Hillsborough.

„Despite these difficulties, Sinn Féin will return to the renewed discussions in two weeks determined to see the full implementation of the agreement,“ he added.

It was apparent yesterday that while the declaration was putting extreme pressure on republicans, pro-agreement unionists led by Mr David Trimble were also under some strain.

Anti-agreement unionists, including some MPs within the Ulster Unionist Party, addressing the declaration from a point diametrically opposed to that of Sinn Féin, were highly sceptical of its proposals.

Mr Jeffrey Donaldson, the UUP MP for Lagan Valley, described the declaration as „extremely woolly“. Mr William Thompson, the UUP MP for West Tyrone, said the declaration was „almost incomprehensible“.


Easter Sunday/Monday, 4/5 April, 1999
No Reneging - Sinn Féin
RM-Distribution

Sinn Fein warned yesterday that the Irish peace process stands in deep crisis over what it said were provocative demands on arms decommissioning.

The party‘s chief negotiator Martin McGuinness said the handing over of arms was „unrealistic and unrealisable“, and said last week‘s failed talks at Hillsborough Castle outside Belfast had „muddied“ the political waters.

A major effort by the British and Irish governments on Thursday to pressure the IRA into an arms handover appears to have backfired, with strong criticism of the move at the annual commemotation ceremonies for the Easter 1916 uprising.

Following an adjournment of the talks, the two Prime Ministers, Bertie Ahern and Tony Blair, jointly declared that weapons decommissioning was an „obligation“ and formally backed unionist demands that seats on the power-sharing Executive be made conditional on some form of arms destruction or dumping.

Their vehement support of the unionist position was badly received by Sinn Fein, who consider the declaration to be at odds with the terms of the Good Friday Agreement. A week of intense behind-the-scenes contacts to rescue peace efforts is now expected before negotiations resume on April 13.

Mr McGuinness said the declaration was an attempt to rewrite, renegotiate and redraft the Good Friday agreement.

„It‘s not on because that agreement has been endorsed by the overwhelming wish of the people of Ireland.

„And there is an unrealisable and unrealistic demand for a surrender by the IRA,“ he said.

He said Sinn Fein would be entering into political discussions tomorrow week only to seek clarification of what the Hillsborough declaration meant.

He launched a scathing attack on the unionists, whom he accused of not wanting to see the Good Friday agreement implemented.

„As far as we‘re concerned in Sinn Fein, at every stage of this peace process when we gave our word we kept it.

„We have behaved honourably to the end, it is now time for others to behave honourably and give their word.

„The time for delays is over, the time for clarity is here.“

Recalling the sacrifices of the Easter 1916 uprising before a crowd of over a thousand at Glasnevin Cemetary in Dublin, Mr Adams praised IRA Volunteers through the generations.  They had shown great discipline in the face of provocation, he said.

„One of the provocations - aside from continued British Army, RUC and loyalist operations - has been the demand on the IRA to disarm. This is something which the IRA has made clear it feels under no obligation to do.  Indeed, the unionists have attempted and have, to a large degree, succeeded in narrowing the peace process to that issue.“

The dangers of all of this had been pointed out „many times“ to the Irish and British governments, he added.

Under the provisions of the Good Friday Agreement, there was an obligation on all parties to honour their commitment to „work constructively and in good faith with the International Commission and to use any influence they may have to secure disarmament“.  But no-one could now impose extra obligations or commitments.

„There can be no reneging,“ he said.  The message was repeated at over thirty locations as thousands took part in colourful commemoration ceremonies across the island.

Meanwhile, unionists have expressed strong satisfaction at the outcome of the talks last week and said they expect IRA decommisioning will take place within weeks.

But at a meeting on Saturday, triumphant UUP members discussed the possibility of making new demands.  Senior party members asked their party leader to insist there be no link between British army demilitarisation and IRA weapons moves.

Speaking after the meeting, UUP spokesman Ken Maginnis, said spirits in the party were very high—„as high as I have ever seen“.

He said the declaration had successfully established IRA decommissioning as an obligation prior to Sinn Fein obtaining seats in an executive and there would be no shadow executive until the arms handover occurred as verified by the International Body on Decommissioning.

„I think we have cracked it now,“ said UUP leader David Trimble.  „There are still some things to be done but we are getting into the foothills now and the road is getting easier.“


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