Reports obtained from:
(1) Republican News, (2) BBC News, (3) Irish Echo
(4) Derry Journal
Sunningdale and the Dublin/Monaghan bombings 1974
See also http://www.dublinmonaghanbombings.org & http://www.serve.com/pfc/dubmon/intro.htmlTuesday-Wednesday, 11-12 May, 2004
Wednesday, May 12, 2004
Friday, 14 May, 2004
Saturday-Monday, 15-17 May, 2004
Tuesday-Wednesday, 11-12 May, 2004
Gardai suspected British role in Dublin/Monaghan bombings
By Republican News
The Garda police in the 26 Counties suspected their northern counterparts were involved with unionist death squads in perpetrating the Dublin and Monaghan bombings of 1974.
Mr John P McMahon, a retired deputy Garda commissioner and chief superintendent of Cavan/Monaghan at the time of the bombings, said gardai suspected that the unionist paralimitary UVF was assisted by members of security forces in the North in constructing the bombs.
When asked by counsel for the Justice for the Forgotten group if gardai had identified a particular organisation, Mr McMahon said: "Yes, we believed it was the UVF in Portadown."
Mr Eoin McGonigal SC, for the O'Brien and O'Neill families and Mr Frank Massey, asked if the Garda had a view of the capacity of the UVF to construct the bombs used.
"Doubts were certainly entertained as to their capacity to do it," Mr McMahon said. The explosive used in the bombs, ANFO, was more commonly used by the IRA, and the UVF was not thought to have the expertise to make such bombs, he said.
When asked by Mr McGonigal if it was the belief within the Garda that the bomb used in Monaghan was constructed on a farm in Portadown by the UVF who may have been assisted by the security forces, Mr McMahon replied: "That has never been ruled out. It remains a possibility."
Relations between the northern and southern authorities were "fragile and sensitive" at the time, he said.
"The view, in the south, was that information forthcoming about loyalist paramilitaries was not as fulsome as information about the Provisional IRA."
Although gardai had suspicions as to the individuals involved in the bombings, there was not sufficient evidence, as far as he was aware, to support a prosecution.
"Identification was a problem. It would have been very important to have an identification parade but that was not feasible at the time because of political and other considerations," he said.
A 10-minute tape, showing the destruction on the streets of Dublin, was played at the inquest last week. Broadcaster and journalist Vincent Browne also appeared before the inquest to describe the disturbing scenes in Talbot Street in the minutes after the bomb exploded there.
Subsequently, , the former head of the State Forensic Laboratory has said that the car bomb that killed 11 people in Parnell Street was consistent with bombs used by the IRA at the time.
British forces have been accused of supplying or using seized IRA material for the manufacture of the bombs which exploded in Dublin and Monaghan.
Dr James Donovan has told the inquests on the deaths of the victims of the Dublin and Monaghan bombings that forensic samples brought from the scene at Parnell Street contained explosives commonly used by the IRA.
However he said the bomb used could have been a copy of the IRA devices.
* A report into various atrocities which took place over 30 years ago will be published at the beginning of next month, it has been confirmed.
Mr Justice Henry Barron is due to report on the Dublin bombings of 1972 and 1973 as well as many other pre-1974 bombings and the murders of Brid Carr in 1971, Oliver Boyce and Brid Porter. He will then publish a separate report on the murder of Seamus Ludlow in County Louth in 1976.
The third report on later cases, including the Dundalk bombing of 1975 and the Castleblayney bombing, may be finished by the end of the year.
Fall of Sunningdale recounted
The story of the Ulster Workers' Council strike which brought Northern Ireland to a standstill 30 years ago is to be told in a BBC documentary. Shutdown will recount the events leading up to the strike in 1974, which killed off the Sunningdale Agreement - the 1970s equivalent of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Good Friday Agreement.
The UWC committee which ran the strike included paramilitary leaders from groups such as the Ulster Defence Association and the Ulster Volunteer Force.
The key to the strike was whether the government could maintain electricity supplies.
It could not and industrial production was wrecked with power cuts of up to 18 hours.
Streets were blocked off and petrol stations were controlled by loyalist paramilitaries.
Rubbish was not collected and there were reports that undertakers would not bury the dead.
Initially, little attention was paid to the UWC but staff at Ballylumford power station in County Antrim were persuaded to support the strike.
"We were met by one of the leading politicians in Larne who persuaded the power workers at the time to take part in the action," said Trevor Peoples.
"Quite a lot of people in the station did not want to take part in the strike but because we lived in an area that was fairly loyalist, a lot of people found that there were road blocks and they couldn't get to their work anyway.
"People were threatened in their own homes, doors were locked and people were told not to go to their work."
Glen Barr, who was described at the time as a senior adviser to the UDA, played a leading part in the strike.
"Everybody knows that after the second or third day there was no discouragement, there was no need for it," he said.
"This whole concept that if the Army had moved against us they would have broken the strike, but everybody was well warned there was to be no confrontation with the security forces because we knew precisely that they would try to draw us into confrontation and that was what would have discredited the whole thing."
The Northern Ireland Office was folding its arms and waiting to see if the executive would survive Don Anderson Author Don Anderson, a BBC journalist in 1974 who has written a book about the strike, explained why the strikers succeeded.
"By the end of the 14 day period I think there is clear evidence that the strikers had won support," he said.
"The strikers were able to operate in the assumption that generally Protestants were going to back them.
"One of the reasons for this was that it was evident that the Northern Ireland Office was not backing the executive. It was folding its arms and waiting to see if the executive would survive.
"That being the case, in effect the government, the running of the place such as it was in all the chaos, passed to the strikers."
The contents of a memo drafted during the strike by the then secretary of state, Merlyn Rees- are revealed in Wednesday's programme.
"While the Northern Ireland Executive remains in being, there can be no real movement. But the situation changes once they go" - this has been typed over with "either by resignation or by being sacked".
Power-sharing
Former SDLP leader John Hume, then Executive Minister of Commerce, said he was astonished by the memo.
"That new material would suggest that they wanted the executive which is astonishing, to come down," he said.
"They simply stood aside and allowed the workers council strike run by paramilitary organisations to succeed."
The political backdrop to the strike began in late 1973, when the Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath held talks at Sunningdale in Berkshire with the Irish Government and three of the province's political parties - the Official Unionists led by Brian Faulkner, the nationalist SDLP and the non-sectarian Alliance.
They agreed to set up a power-sharing executive body for Northern Ireland and, eventually, a Council of Ireland involving the Irish Republic with limited jurisdiction over issues of joint concern between north and south.
The declaration also recognised the wishes of unionists to remain within the UK and nationalists for a united Ireland.
Both sides agreed that the will of the majority should be respected.
However, hardline loyalists - led by Harry West, Ian Paisley and William Craig - did not attend most of the talks at Sunningdale, and when the proposals were announced, they criticised them strongly.
The new executive took power formally on 1 January 1974 with Brian Faulkner as its chief executive and SDLP leader Gerry Fitt as his deputy, but it swiftly ran into trouble.
While the three parties represented on the executive had a majority in the province's assembly, which had been elected the previous year, it faced strong opposition from loyalists opposed to power-sharing.
On one occasion, the police had to eject loyalists including Mr Paisley forcibly from the chamber.
The same month, Mr Faulkner was defeated 427-374 in the Unionist Council, the governing body of his party, when he tried to win approval for Sunningdale.
He was replaced as Official Unionist leader by Harry West.
In February, a general election saw Labour returned to power in Westminster and 11 of the 12 seats in Northern Ireland won by unionists opposed to the deal under the umbrella of the United Ulster Unionist Council.
Of those supporting the executive, only Gerry Fitt was elected as the UUUC won more than 50% of the vote.
With the Sunningdale executive tottering on the edge of breaking up, the coup de grace was delivered by the UWC strike in May after the assembly approved the agreement.
Direct rule was reimposed by Mr Rees and the assembly prorogued.
Shutdown: The Inside Story of the Ulster Workers' Strike on BBC ONE NI on Wednesday, May 12 at 2250 BST.
Story from BBC NEWS: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/3706449.stm
Copyright © 2004 BBC NEWS
The need for truth
Editorial
By Irish Echo
It's perhaps understandable why at least some in the Irish coalition government of 1974 might have been less than enthusiastic about uncovering the full truth behind the bombings in Dublin and Monaghan on the evening of May 17 that year.
After all, if the suspicions of many citizens were confirmed, there was more than a red loyalist hand behind the attacks and the resulting slaughter and mayhem visited upon the Irish capital, and Monaghan's county town.
If that additional hand had been revealed as a British one, or one attached to the Northern Ireland security services, the bombings would have amounted to a virtual declaration of war against a peaceful and friendly neighbor.
And what could the Republic have done in those circumstances? Probably not a lot.
So it is not too difficult to imagine an instinctive attempt to obfuscate, obscure and perhaps mislead.
It is not too difficult to imagine politicians seeing the bombings as a means of impressing on people in the South the reality of what their Northern neighbors were going through at the hands of the IRA.
All in all, it's not hard to imagine a coverup.
Thirty years on, it's still hard to imagine the whole truth coming out. But it's not impossible.
There have been calls for a full public inquiry into the bombings, memories of which linger in the hearts of many more than just the immediate victims or their families.
Such an inquiry might be unsettling for some. But it would be the start of a full healing process that has been too long delayed.
Copyright © 2004 Irish Echo
British 'Irresponsibility' Led To 30 Years Of Tragedy
FOYLE MP John Hume has said that the 'irresponsibility 'of the British government in capitulating to the UWC strike in 1974 led to 30 years of tragedy in the North.
Mr. Hume was speaking on the 30th anniversary of the Ulster Workers Strike which brought down the power sharing Executive set up in 1974.
A recently released memo revealed that the then British Secretary of State, Merlyn Rees, did not support the Executive.
The memo said: ""While the Northern Ireland Executive remains in being, there can be no real movement. But the situation changes once they go" - this has been typed over with "either by resignation or by being sacked".
Mr. Hume said: "It was very obvious at the time that Merlyn Rees did not support the existence of the Executive since they allowed the UWC strike to succeed.
"But it is still astonishing that the Secretary of State at the time should have been working on the principle that it was better to allow the Executive to collapse than to confront the strikers.
"They simply stood aside and allowed the workers council strike run by paramilitary organisations to succeed."
Mr. Hume, who was Minister of Commerce in the 1974 Executive, said that the 'irresponsibility' as he described it was all the more tragic in that a lot of suffering and tragedy could have been avoided.
He said: "You cannot help but wonder how many lives might have been saved if the Executive had survived.
"It is all the more tragic when 30 years later the institutions of the Good Friday Agreement are almost identical to the institutions of the Sunningdale Agreement.
"The attitude that prevailed in the British government in 1974 was one where they did not want to be involved in the affairs of the North.
"The price we paid for that sort of irresponsibility was immense."
The UWC strike in may 1974 brought down the power sharing executive set up after the Sunningdale Agreement.
The strikers were able to bring the North to a standstill by cutting off power using the industrial might of the electricity workers.
During the 14 days of the strike there were widespread reports of intimidation and threats.
Road blocks were manned by masked loyalist paramilitaries and people were prevented from going to work.
Things deteriorated when petrol supplies began to run out and the Executive was powerless to take any action.
Many commentators looking back on the strike believe that support within the Protestant community increased after it became obvious that the British government through the Northern Ireland Office was not going to stand up to the strikers.
In Derry the strike had little support and initially made little impact on the daily lives of the people.
However, as the strike progressed the power cuts that were widespread across the North began to bite.
More and more the normal life of the city was brought to a standstill as power was cut for longer periods.
At times there were reports of power cuts lasting up to ten hours at a time.
The situation worsened when workers at Coolkeeragh Power Station voted to support the strike.
Due to the hardship caused by the power cuts communities resorted to measures to look after the vulnerable with some communities establishing food kitchens.
Eventually the British army was sent in to man petrol stations but their presence was seen by many people as being too little too late.
As the strike progressed the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson made a televised address in which he caused outrage by referring to people here as 'spongers'.
Eventually the Executive collapsed in what was seen by loyalists as a great victory for them and life in the North slowly got back to normal.
Copyright © 2004 Derry Journal
Saturday-Monday, 15-17 May, 2004
Ireland's blitz
By Republican News
Today is the 30th anniversary of the Dublin and Monaghan bombings, the worst single day of the recent conflict in Ireland, and there have been fresh appeals for a probe of the involvement of the British Crown forces.
Thirty-four people died on Talbot Street, Parnell Street, and Nassau Street in Dublin, and in Monaghan town, on May 17th, 1974.
The Justice for the Forgotten group, which includes most of those injured and bereaved in the attacks, called on the Dublin government to put more pressure on the British government to co-operate with a public inquiry into the bombings.
Speaking at a memorial service on Dublin's Talbot Street, chairwoman for the campaign Bernie McNally said that the inquiry had been sidelined for too long.
"The Irish Government have got to carry out their duty in a responsible way and pressurise Tony Blair to conform," said Ms McNally, a survivor of the bombings.
In her address to the assembled crowd - comprising survivors, family members of the deceased, and trade unionists - Ms McNally labelled Tony Blair a "hypocrite" as he claims to be wiping out terrorism, while he ignores the plight of those affected by the bombings.
Wreaths were laid at the memorial statue, to the music of a lone piper.
Wary of the public resentment at the failure to hold a full international inquiry into the attacks, the Irish Prime Minister, Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, fielded questions from the press and members of the campaign.
He admitted that it was hard to believe that the British had no information on the attacks, which is widely believed to have involved members of the British security forces.
"We have done substantial work over the last five years and we have to keep at it," Mr Ahern said. "We could be here having an inquiry but 49 of the top 50 people we want couldn't come, so we wouldn't actually achieve anything".
Yesterday, the President, Mrs McAleese, officially dedicated a memorial pillar to the seven people killed in the bombing in Monaghan town.
The 20-foot high bronze and sandstone sculpture was designed by Dublin artist Ciaran O Cearnaigh.
The dedication ceremony was attended by a crowd of almost 2,000 people, including relatives of the Dublin and Monaghan victims.
The names of the victims of not only the 1974 bombings, but also the Dublin bombings of 1972 and loyalist attacks on towns along the Border in the same period, were read out.
The stories of all those affected by the blitz-like attacks were remembered today in media coverage of the events.
The family of Anne Byrne, a Donaghmede housewife, did not realise how many lives had been affected by the attacks until they attended a ceremony to mark the 25th anniversary of the bombings.
Mrs Byrne, aged 35, was killed on Talbot Street while on a shopping trip.
Her daughter Michelle O'Brien remembers hearing the bombs going off and being told by a neighbour that they sounded like gas explosions.
"Our father tried very hard to shelter us from what happened, so it wasn't until the 25th anniversary that we realised that we weren't the only ones affected," she said.
"My father always found it too hard to talk about my mother's death. It's still tough.
"I remember that she loved her home - we'd only moved there two years earlier and she was just like any other mother."
Edward John O'Neill, a 39-year-old self-employed decorator, was with two sons were on Parnell Street when the first no-warning bomb exploded.
Edward junior, now aged 34, remembers his father instinctively turning to shield the boys, allowing his own body to take the full force of the blast.
Mr O'Neill died at the scene, while the children both suffered serious injuries.
Three months after the attack, Mrs O'Neill gave birth to a still-born daughter, named Baby Martha, who was buried alongside her father.
Sinn Fein's Caoimhghin O Caolain said the dignity of the survivors and the bereaved was an inspiration.
"Sadly, 30 years on, the British government has yet to admit any responsibility for the bombings. It continues to withhold information on the role of its forces in the atrocity. It treated the inquiry of Justice Barron with contempt.
"The surviving members of the Fine Gael/Labour coalition Government of 1974 owe an explanation to the Irish people on why they turned a blind eye to the involvement of a foreign government in the worst bombings of the conflict which were intended to kill as many civilians as possible.
"Members of successive governments also need to answer that question."
Saturday-Monday, 15-17 May, 2004
Bombed and abandoned
By Republican News
The following is an extract from 'Bombed and Abandoned - The experience of the bereaved and maimed of the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings', by Don Mullan.
1974 - THE POLITICAL CONTEXT
Seamus Mallon has famously described the Good Friday Agreement as "Sunningdale for slow learners". As the summer of 1974 began, Unionist and Loyalist opposition to the Sunningdale Agreement, which included a power-sharing executive and a ministerial Council of Ireland, gathered momentum. On 15 May 1974 a strike organised by a recently established coalition, the Ulster Workers' Council (UWC) began. The strike had a co-ordinating committee which included paramilitary leaders from the UVF and UDA and Unionist politicians including: Ian Paisley, William Craig and Harry West. Widespread intimidation of workers was reported as the strike tightened its stranglehold across the north. At Westminster on 16 May, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Merlyn Rees, warned Unionist MP's that 'their loyalism will lead them to come up against British troops'. However, at no point during the strike did the British Military move to end intimidation or clear the 'Queen's Highways' for the free movement of people and resources. Indeed, it is now known that British Military Intelligence, in particular MI5, supported the Loyalists and that several hard-core paramilitaries were being run by them. At 5.30pm on 17 May, three no-warning bombs exploded within ninety seconds in Dublin and a fourth exploded in Monaghan town, 88 minutes later. A total of 33 people (mostly women) were killed and hundreds maimed. It was to be the biggest loss of life in any single day of the 'Troubles'.
The rationale behind the bombing of Dublin and Monaghan was part of an uncompromising political strategy aimed at destroying the Sunningdale Agreement, in particular, the Council of Ireland dimension. Both the UDA and UVF denied responsibility. However, the Press Officer of the UWC strike's co-ordinating committee, Sammy Smith (UDA), gloated, 'I am very happy about the bombings in Dublin. There is a war with the Free State and now we are laughing at them.' His committee colleague, the Christian minister, Ian Paisley, neither rebuked Smith for his comments nor condemned the bombings.
Amongst the dead and injured were: Collete Doherty who was nine months pregnant; a young French Jewish woman, Simon Chetrit, who was born in occupied France during the Holocaust; an Italian citizen, Antonio Magliocco, who ran a Fish and Chip shop, and a young family; John and Anne O'Brien and their daughters, Jacqueline (5 months) and Anne Marie (17 months), who were enjoying a walk in the sunshine. The idea of anyone laughing at the unfathomable suffering inflicted by such carnage is beyond comprehension.
The death of the Sunningdale Agreement occurred on 28 May when Brian Falkner and pro-Agreement Unionist politicians resigned under pressure. Anti-Agreement Unionists celebrated throughout the province with dancing and bonfires. The following day, 29 May 1974, the UWC strike ended.
THE GARDA INVESTIGATION
The nature, extent and adequacy of the Garda Investigation into the Dublin/Monaghan bombings is largely unknown in the absence of full public accountability. What we do know is that within weeks of the explosions the Garda Detective Branch and Special Branch had identified eight prime suspects, all from the Portadown/Lurgan area of Co. Armagh. The identities of the suspects were strengthened by a number of key eyewitnesses, one of whom I have spoken with, who had eye to eye contact with the South Leinster Street bomber. All suspects were known members of the mid-Ulster UVF Brigade. These included the now deceased William Hanna, William Fulton, Wesley Sommerville, Harris Boyle and Robin 'The Jackal' Jackson. David Alexander Mulholland, now living in England and Samual Whitten were also named suspects. According to Yorkshire Television's 'First Tuesday' documentary: Hidden Hand - The Forgotten Massacre, broadcast in 1993, Mulholland and Whitten were identified in police photographs by three separate eyewitnesses as drivers of two of the four bomb cars.
These details are highly significant given the fact that journalists from Yorkshire Television are the only source to date, outside political and police circles, who have been given limited access to the Garda files into the bombings. The Gardai would not hand over their files to Yorkshire Television but agreed, according to Glyn Middleton, one the producers, 'to answer any questions related to the bombings as fully and accurately as they could from the files'. Over a number of days in 1992 Yorkshire Television met with assigned members of the Garda which resulted in several hours of audio recordings of information read directly from the Garda files. They starkly challenge the Taoiseach's assertion to Relative for Justice that he had discovered "...nothing in the files that would have suggested or indicated who was responsible".
When I put the Taoiseach's comments recently to Middleton, he answered:
"Direct evidence from those files suggested there were a number of people who had a strong case to answer. At the very least you expect those leads to be followed up and properly investigated on both sides of the border. It is clear to Yorkshire Television that this was not done."
According to 'First Tuesday', the Garda extended their list of suspects with an additional 12 names, derived from intelligence sources in the North. The Garda files name William "Frenchie" Marchant, the leader of the Belfast hijackers, and Billy Fulton, the quarter master who took charge of the explosives used. The files also name three leading Loyalists as the planners of the bombings: Billy Hanna, the leader of the UVF in Portadown; Harris Boyle, second-in-command; and Robin 'The Jackle' Jackson. Within weeks, 'First Tuesday' asserts, "the Garda had a list of twenty suspects..." 'First Tuesday' also state that the Garda enjoyed good co-operation from the RUC in the early stages of their investigations. However, Gardai who travelled from Dublin, expecting to have the suspects arrested and interrogated, found the trail running cold at RUC headquarters. One Garda officer interviewed by 'First Tuesday' stated, "... there was definitely a lack of co-operation. Our investigation had to end because we couldn't get any further in the north. The well just ran dry." Chief Superintendent John Paul McMahon, who lead the Monaghan murder hunt wrote:
"These investigations were greatly hampered by reason of the fact that no direct enquiries could be made in the area where the crime originated. There was no access to potential witnesses in Northern Ireland and there was also the disadvantage of not having been able to interrogate likely suspects and put them on identification parades."
Yorkshire's 'First Tuesday' programme also reveals that the RUC did, indeed, conduct their own investigations. Two Special Branch officers, who were tasked with finding out more about the bombings, spoke to programme-makers off-camera. According to 'First Tuesday':
"They confirmed they had a list of UVF suspects which tallied with the Garda's. They reported their information to RUC Headquarters but were never asked to interview or arrest any of the suspects."
The above, however, is contradicted in a letter sent by the RUC to the solicitors representing the families, dated 28 Auguest 1996. It states:
"... (4a) ... a number of persons were arrested and interviewed in relation to the theft of the vehicles. (4b) A number of persons were arrested and interviewed in relation to these murders. (5) Details arising from the interviews... as well as other material, were passed to An Garda Siochana at various stages of its enquiry."
This assertion by the RUC is disputed by 'First Tuesday' who state that in Garda Chief Superintendent John Joy's final report he wrote:
"Enquiries in regard to [suspects] are being made by the RUC and results of the investigation will be reported."
'First Tuesday' states catagorically: "There is no record on the Garda file that the RUC ever did report back."
Within three months of the explosions, the Garda investigation into the biggest mass murder in the history of the State was wound down and detectives working on the case assigned to other duties.
At one level it would appear the Garda had done all in their power to hunt down the killers, only to have their efforts frustrated by a sectarian police force north of the border. But such a conclusion is too simplistic. Something isn't right. Proper procedures were, in many instances, not followed, and additional avenues of useful pressure appear not to have been explored.
THE COSGRAVE CABINET
There is a serious and crucial question to be truthfully answered, as yet, by both An Garda Siochana and the Government. It relates to the vexed issued of identified suspects and the RUC's apparent unwillingness to move against them. The present Garda Commissioner must clarify whether or not his force informed the Cosgrave Government of the names of those suspects and the difficulties his officers were encountering with theRUC. When I put this point recently to a senior Garda officer-in-charge in Dublin at the time, he replied:
"I would be surprised if the Minister for Justice wasn't informed."
If this senior officer is correct, it means that at Cabinet level the Irish Government of the day knew the names of the prime suspects shortly after the bombings. However, three surviving members of the Cabinet's five-man security committee; Patrick Cooney (Minister for Justice), Conor Cruise O'Brien (Minister for Posts & Telegraphs) and Patrick Donegan (Minister for Defence), have denied knowledge of any Garda list of suspects. When the question was put to former Taoiseach Cosgrave by Yorkshire Television he declined to answer any questions about the bombings.
A member of Cosgrave's Cabinet, Justin Keating (Minister for Industry & Commerce), quoted in The Irish Independent (11 July 1993) lends weight to the senior Garda officer's comment:
"It is perfectly possible that it [the list of suspects] went to the Cabinet Security Committee. It might have been a political decision of theirs not to inform their Cabinet colleagues."
There are very serious implications in this for An Garda Siochana. Either they did or they didn't inform the Government of the names of the suspects. If they did, then at least one member of Cosgrave's Cabinet may be lying to the nation and, in so doing, leaving An Garda Siochana open to justifiable accusations of incompetence. If they did not inform the Government of the list of suspects and their difficulties with the RUC, then they certainly do have a case to answer as to why they didn't.
When interviewed by Yorkshire Television in 1993, Merlyn Rees, then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, expressed astonishment that there was detailed information about those suspected of involvement in the Dublin and Monaghan bombings. He said he was not notified. He continued:
"If names were given and the names were in the north, it would be my job, without ever interfering in the day to day security matters, to make clear that something's got to be done within the rule of Law - that these people should be questioned and if needs be, dealt with by the full process of law."
Arising out of this scenario, additional questions require answers. If the Government had the names of the suspects, what did they do with this information, then and since? Did the Government seek the co-operation of the British Government in apprehending the suspects? If not, why not?
These questions alone warrant the establishment of a Tribunal of Inquiry. But they are not the only ones.
TREATED LIKE LEPERS
The Garda conducted its own internal investigation, following the broadcast of the 'First Tuesday' programme. This culminated in a statement issued on the 21st anniversary of the bombings by the Department of Justice in 1995. The statement dismisses with near nonchalance the 'First Tuesday' documentary which Yorkshire Television, to their credit, invested #400,000stg on making and, again to their credit, spent over two years longer in researching, than the original Garda investigation. Indicative of the general lack of interest in rigorously pursuing this case by the Irish media is the fact that no one seemed curious enough in 1995 to call Yorkshire Television to invite their response. Thus, the Department of Justice's statement, which included, amongst others, a conclusion by the Garda Commissioner that 'there was no lack of co-operation between the police forces involved', went unchallenged.
Whether or not the RUC did co-operate, and to what extent, can only be verified by a detailed examination of the files of An Garda Siochana. Requests by the families of the deceased to see the Garda Files have been continuously refused and indeed, legal efforts to gain access to the Garda files have been vigorously fought by the Gardai in the Irish High Court (1997) and the Supreme Court (1998). The question is why?
When one juxtaposes the Dublin/Monaghan bombings alongside the Landsdown Road soccer riot in 1995 - which was the subject of a Tribunal of Inquiry - suspicions again are raised about official resistance, given the gulf of magnitude between the two cases.
Furthermore, An Garda Siochana have failed to visit each of the families who lost their loved ones to discuss their ongoing investigations with them, as is normal procedure in an open murder case. For several years, victims support has been a core value in Garda training and practice, but not with the victims of the Dublin and Monaghan bombings. Why?
What hurts most for the families and the wounded is the awful sense of abandonment by their politicians and police who have consistently failed to deal openly and honestly with their right to truth. Frank Massey, whose 21 year old twin daughter Anna was murdered in South Leinster Street, speaks with consummate anger and bitterness when he say, "We've been treated like lepers. Instead of being innocent victims, we've been treated as though we are the guilty".