1 April 2004
Cory Collusion Inquiry Report: Pat Finucane [extract]
Cory Collusion Inquiry Report: Robert Hamill [extract]
Cory Collusion Inquiry Report: Rosemary Nelson [extract]
Cory Collusion Inquiry Report: Pat Finucane
[extract]
Although the definition of the term "Collusion" was set out earlier in this report it may be helpful to repeat the definition.
How should collusion be defined? Synonyms that are frequently given for the verb to collude are these: to conspire; to connive; to collaborate; to plot; and to scheme. The verb "connive" is defined as to deliberately ignore; to overlook; to disregard; to pass over; to take no notice of; to turn a blind eye; to wink; to excuse; to condone; to look the other way; to let something ride; see for example the Oxford Compact Thesaurus Second Edition 2001.
Similarly the Webster dictionary defines the verb collude in this way: to connive with another: conspire, plot.
It defines the verb connive as follows:
(a) to be indulgent, tolerant or secretly in favour or sympathy; (b) wink at youthful follies; (c) to cooperate secretly: to have a secret understanding.
In the narrower context how should collusion be defined for the purposes of this inquiry? At the outset it should be recognised that members of the public must have confidence in the actions of Governmental agencies, particularly those of the Army and the police force. There cannot be public confidence in Government agencies that are guilty of collusion in serious crimes. Because of the necessity for public confidence in the Army, the Police, and Security Services the definition of collusion must be reasonably broad when it is applied to actions of these agencies. This is to say that Army and police forces must not act collusively by ignoring or turning a blind eye to the wrongful acts of their servants or agents. Any lesser definition would have the effect of condoning, or even encouraging, state involvement in crimes, thereby shattering all public confidence in these important agencies.
In determining whether there are indications of state collusion in the murder of Patrick Finucane, it is important to look at the issue from two perspectives. First, it must be seen whether the documents indicate that the action or inaction of Government agencies might have directly contributed to the killing of Patrick Finucane by the UDA. Secondly it is necessary to examine collusive acts which may have indirectly contributed to the killing, by generally facilitating the terrorist activities of the UDA. That is, the evidence may reveal a pattern of behaviour by a Government agency that comes within the definition of collusion. This evidence may add to and form part of the cumulative effect which emerges from a reading of the documents. Both perspectives will be considered in determining whether the evidence indicates that there have been acts of collusion by Government agencies.
B. Instances where the documentary evidence does not establish collusion
Before reviewing those state actions that do, in my view, constitute collusion, it may be helpful to refer to two other matters which have been brought to my attention. Quite simply, the documentary evidence that I have reviewed does not support either of the allegations.
1. Vehicle check point and search operation
In February 1999, the group British Irish Rights Watch alleged that the termination and removal of vehicle check points in the vicinity of the Finucane home prior to the murder was a collusive action taken to facilitate the murder.
A similar allegation has been advanced in a written brief submitted to this Inquiry I have reviewed is a statement taken from Soldier BBB on 21 June 2000. He stated that, in direct response to this allegation, he conducted a careful review of all army logs pertaining to vehicle check points and garage searches in the neighbourhood of the Finucane home on the day of the shooting. Vehicle searches were generally carried out in the daytime and suspended when it became dark. This general rule was adhered to on 12 February 1989. The army had received information that mortar bombs might be hidden in the area close to the Finucane home. As a result, a search of nearby garages was carried out, but when nothing was found, the search was called off.
There is no evidence in the documents that the suspension of either the garage searches or the vehicle searches close to the Finucane home was a sinister or collusive act.
However, in the Panorama program "Licence to Kill: Part I", broadcast 11 July 2002, Loyalist D is reported to have stated that an RUC policeman, who had earlier encouraged him to shoot Patrick Finucane, called him to say that the road block had been taken down.
The question of whether such a call was made, by whom, its contents, and the surrounding circumstances is something that a public inquiry might wish to explore.
2. Was there an RUC officer in the [company name redacted] taxi?
In a written submission to this inquiry, a suggestion was made that there was evidence that an officer from the RUC was a member of the group that hijacked the [company name redacted] taxi a short time before the murder. There is no documentary evidence or statement which supports this allegation. Whether a public inquiry should nonetheless wish to explore this question is not a matter for me to comment upon.
Bearing in mind the definition of collusion, it may be helpful to set out in summary form those state actions which could be deemed collusive Like all condensations it suffers from the effects of compression and displays all the symptoms of a case of the bends. It should only be considered in the context of the relevant sections of the complete report.
1. FRU
The following matters are relevant in considering whether FRU engaged in collusive acts:
Did FRU have advance knowledge that Patrick Finucane was being targeted by the UDA?
The documents clearly raise questions as to whether or not FRU knew, in advance, that the UDA was planning to target and kill Patrick Finucane. There are conflicts in the documentary evidence that can only be resolved at a public hearing. On the one hand, Brian Nelson insists in his 1990 statement, and his written account recovered from Stormont, that he told his handlers about the events leading up to the murder on 12 February 1989. While Nelson recanted certain statements in 1993, he nonetheless maintained that he had told his handlers about UDA plans to kill a PIRA solicitor. On the other hand, the handlers, in their statements, deny that Nelson told them about Patrick Finucane before the shooting on 12 February 1989. Moreover, there are no CFs or TCFs recording any such information prior to 13 February 1989. The resolution of this conflict requires findings of credibility, which I am not in a position to make. I do, however, note the following matters which may lend support to Nelson's assertions:
If Nelson is correct in stating that he told his handlers that Patrick Finucane was a target, and no steps were taken by FRU to either warn Patrick Finucane or otherwise intervene, then that would be capable of constituting a collusive act. This follows, as it would mean that FRU had turned a blind eye to the threat against Patrick Finucane, notwithstanding that the information came from someone that they considered to be an outstanding agent. Only a public inquiry can determine whether this occurred. The evidence I have seen warrants the holding of a public inquiry on this issue.
The CFs and TCFs - the records kept in the usual and ordinary course of the business of FRU - leave little doubt that, on occasion, handlers provided information to Nelson that facilitated his targeting activities. While there is no indication that handlers provided information that specifically pertained to Patrick Finucane, this breach of policy is significant, as it demonstrates a general pattern of behaviour on the part of Nelson's handlers that could be considered collusive. They were aware that Nelson was a central player within the UDA, and that he had considerable influence in directing targeting operations. They were also aware that Nelson often played a direct and active role in reconnaissance missions. The provision of information to Nelson in these circumstances may be seen as evidence of collusive behaviour that had the potential to facilitate the deadly operations planned by the UDA.
There can be no doubt that Nelson, by his own admission, committed criminal acts. He entered pleas of guilty to 20 terrorist related crimes, including five separate instances of conspiracy to murder. Even more importantly, the CFs and TCFs reveal that the army handlers were aware, or at the very least, most certainly ought to have been aware, of the criminal acts of Nelson. Little or no effort was taken to prohibit or discourage Nelson from committing criminal acts. It is apparent from some of the CFs that the handlers were more concerned with Nelson's security, and avoiding police detection, than they were with stopping his criminal activity. The documents I have examined disclose that Army handlers and their superiors turned a blind eye to the criminal acts of Nelson. In doing this they established a pattern of behaviour that could be characterized as collusive.
The evidence given by the CO FRU, (Soldier "J"), at Nelson's trial could only be described as misleading. The statement that Nelson's actions were responsible for saving close to 217 lives was based on a highly dubious numerical analysis that cannot be supported on any basis. The troubling evidence given at Nelson's trial, coupled with FRU's knowledge of his criminal activities, is part of the cumulative picture that should be examined in determining whether FRU acted collusively in the murder of Patrick Finucane. e. FRU collusion
The documents either in themselves or taken cumulatively can be taken to indicate that FRU committed acts of collusion. Further, there is strong if, in some instances, conflicting documentary evidence that FRU committed collusive acts. Only a public inquiry can resolve the conflict.
2. The Security Service
Much of the work of the Security Service is not relevant to my inquiry. However, the agent operations that the Security Service ran in Northern Ireland did give rise to conduct that appears to fall within the definition of collusion.
The apparent failure of the Security Service to suggest to RUC SB that action should be taken on these threats might, itself, be capable of constituting collusive action. At the very least, these matters add to the cumulative pattern of conduct demonstrated by the relevant Government agencies and should be considered in the context of a public inquiry.
3. RUC Special Branch
In my view, the following conduct of the RUC SB is directly relevant to the question of collusion:
The failure to act on information received in 1989, both before and after the Finucane murder, is indicative of collusion and should be the subject of inquiry at a public hearing.
D. [censored by British government]
Some of the acts summarized above are, in and of themselves, capable of constituting acts of collusion. Further, the documents and statements I have referred to in this review have a cumulative effect. Considered together, they clearly indicate to me that there is strong evidence that collusive acts were committed by the Army (FRU), the RUC SB and the Security Service. I am satisfied that there is a need for a public inquiry.
Cory Collusion Inquiry Report: Robert Hamill
[extract]
In the narrower context how should collusion be defined for the purposes of the Robert Hamill case? At the outset it should be recognised that members of the public must have confidence in the actions of Governmental agencies, particularly those of the police force. There cannot be public confidence in a Government agency that is guilty of collusion or connivance in serious crimes. Because of the necessity for public confidence in the police, the definition of collusion must be reasonably broad when it is applied to police actions. This is to say that police forces must not act collusively by ignoring or turning a blind eye to the wrongful acts of their officers or of their servants or agents. Nor can the police act collusively by supplying information to assist those committing wrongful acts or by encouraging them to commit wrongful acts. Any lesser definition would have the effect of condoning, or even encouraging, state involvement in crimes, thereby shattering all public confidence in important Government agencies. This case is unique in that it will turn on whether or not police officers, by assisting or counselling the Protestant rioters or by turning a blind eye to their misconduct, acted in a collusive manner.
In determining whether there are indications of state collusion in the murder of Robert Hamill, it is important to look at the issue from two perspectives. First, it must be seen whether the documents indicate that the action or inaction of the police might have directly contributed to the killing of Robert Hamill or hindered the investigation of his murder or perverted the course of justice. In addition it is necessary to examine collusive acts which may have indirectly contributed to his killing by the Protestant rioters on 27 April 1997 or frustrated the investigation of his death. In this regard it is necessary to examine collusive acts which may have indirectly contributed to the killing by generally facilitating or encouraging or turning a blind eye to the actions or behaviour of the Protestant rioters. That is the evidence may reveal a pattern of behaviour by a Government agency that comes within the definition of collusion. This evidence may add to and form part of the cumulative effect which emerges from a reading of the documents. Both perspectives will be considered in determining whether the evidence indicates that there have been acts of collusion by the police. However the aspect of a direct contribution by the police will have a greater significance in my consideration of what may constitute collusive acts in this case.
B. Importance of the police force to the community
The vital importance of the police force to the community as a whole and to the administration of justice cannot be over emphasised. The first contact members of a community have with the justice system is through police officers. As members of the justice system, police officers must act judiciously. They must always strive to enforce and apply the law fairly, evenly, without bias or discrimination. It can never be forgotten that the role of the police is to serve and protect the entire community not just one segment of it.
The report on the Finucane case referred to the role of the police. Perhaps I can usefully quote three paragraphs from that report.
"The role of the police requires great physical courage, absolute integrity, patience, sensitivity, understanding, and firm discipline both from the individual officer and from the police force as a unit. To perform their duties in today's society police officers must be both intelligent and highly trained. The police must serve and protect all within their community without regard to the colour of their skin, their religion or country of origin. They must act without preference or bias.
The role of the police in a democratic society is of the highest importance. They must exercise all the highest attributes of a police force operating in the most despotic countries. Yet the police in a democracy must go much further. They must recognise that they are subject to the rule of law and always operate within and under the rule of law, no matter how difficult and how frustrating that may be. The police must serve and protect their community but always in a manner that complies with the law. They must protect their community and enforce its laws fairly and without discrimination. Prejudices must be set aside and personal preferences rejected. It is an extremely difficult role. Yet the work of the police is of fundamental importance to their community and country. It is the police who must serve as the role model for all, standing as examples of disciplined courage and fairness. Good police officers deserve the support, recognition and admiration of their community.
... The present reformed police force, designated as The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) , may serve as an example to all the residents of Northern Ireland. It will demonstrate that police officers, whether Catholic or Protestant can work well together. I am sure that these officers will, in the course of their work, display that requisite high degree of courage, impartiality and fairness. The officers themselves will, with the passage of time, learn that they can place their safety and their lives in the hands of a partner of a different religion. From this will develop confidence and trust in their fellow officers and eventually friendship. This cooperation, trust and friendship will truly serve as an example to all in Northern Ireland. This may sound trite, overly optimistic and of only passing relevance to this inquiry. Nonetheless I believe that it is important to state for the benefit of both the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the people they serve.
There is another aspect of police work that must be mentioned. As I have said it is fundamentally important that the police serve and protect the entire community not just one segment of it. It is equally true that all segments of the community should cooperate with the police. It is only with that cooperation that the police will be able to provide the high degree of service and protection that all communities deserve.
C. What actions of the police could constitute collusion
1. The conduct of Reserve Constable B
First and foremost the actions of Reserve Constable B, if established, are capable of being found to constitute the most flagrant type of collusion. His actions did not constitute the simple turning of a blind eye. Rather they could be found to be carefully planned and premeditated actions taken to frustrate a murder investigation and to protect or to exonerate an individual who might have been guilty of murder. The instruction to dispose of Mr O's clothing was an invitation to destroy possible evidence of participation in a murderous assault. If it is established, this action in itself is a dangerous abuse of his position as a police officer and could be found to constitute a flagrant and deliberate act of collusion. Ever since Cain slew Abel, murder has been considered by all societies to be the most serious of crimes. Every democratic country expects a murder case to be investigated fully, fairly, thoroughly and carefully. Yet the actions of Reserve Constable B could be found to have frustrated a full and careful police investigation of Robert Hamill's murder
It is true that Officer B has always denied making the call to the O home shortly after 8.00am on the morning of 27 April. It is obviously not for me to make findings of fact. However the evidence referred to in the segment headed "Conspiracy to pervert the course of justice: the conduct of Reserve Constable B" is of such a worrisome nature that it, of itself, requires that there be a public inquiry to resolve the issue. If the acts alleged against Officer B are established then it could be found that he deliberately committed a very serious and flagrant act of collusion. If the clothes were destroyed then no forensic testing of them could be carried out and a party to murder may have avoided detection and identification with the deliberate collaboration and assistance of a police officer. The investigation of a murder may have been frustrated and the administration of justice obstructed and perverted by the actions of a police officer.
One might wonder why Officer B would take the step of phoning Mr O's home to advise his parents to tell him to get rid of his clothing if Officer B had not seen Mr O taking part in the assault. If Mr O was never closer to the assault than ten yards and took no part in it then there would be no need to be alarmed about the condition of his clothing or what the testing of the clothing might reveal.
If it was an innocent call or indeed one simply to advise the parents that he had seen their son at the scene of a riot would he take such pains to have a friend (Mr X) falsely state that he was the one who had made the telephone call? The fabrication involved the participation of another couple with all the ramifications and possibilities of disclosure that this would necessarily entail.
The questions raised by the actions alleged to have been taken by Officer B to advise Mr O to get rid of his clothes are so serious that they must be explored in a public inquiry. There is no other way in which to restore public confidence in the PSNI. These alleged actions of a very experienced Reserve Constable, in themselves, warrant the holding of a public inquiry. Moreover it may be that this act affected and permeated the approach of the police to their entire investigation of the Robert Hamill murder.
There are other actions of Officer B that are worrisome. First although he had known Mr O well for a number of years he never mentioned him by name in his earlier statements. It is only in a statement he gave in September 1997 that he first mentioned him by name. Even then he referred to him only in a passing way and indicated that Mr O was no longer active in the Tae Kwon Do club. Yet he identified Mr O to Sergeant J so it is apparent that he knew he was at the scene.
D. Other aspects of police conduct a public inquiry may wish to explore
There are other actions or inactions of the police which a public inquiry may wish to explore. Let us assume that, when the police were aware of fights taking place, they took all reasonable steps to ensure that order was restored and that victims were protected. Nonetheless the following serious questions still remain.
The first issue arises from the police reaction or failure to react to Mr V's warning that others were on the way up from St Patrick's Hall. At that moment the police were also aware that there were others coming up from the bus stop at the bottom of town. The rival groups of Protestants and Catholics were bound to meet. The intersection was a flash point and the police must have been aware that the emotions of both groups were well fuelled by alcohol and could readily ignite.
Police records indicate that over the six months prior to 27 April, 17 incidents had occurred at this junction. In light of this, was it reasonable to move the Land Rover to its third and final position where the officers would have great difficulty seeing those coming up Thomas Street from the Hall? Although these actions may well be simply manifestations of an error in judgment on the part of the police, they could also be found to be collusive acts taken to assist the Protestant rioters. Only a public inquiry could determine the issue.
There is conflicting evidence from the officers in the Land Rover as to what could be heard. There can be little doubt that with the vehicle closed up and the motor running it would be difficult for the officers to hear what was being said outside. Yet Constable D noted that he could hear shouting outside while chatting with Mr R and Mr Q. In addition, Constable C could hear yelling while the doors of the vehicle were shut and the engine was running.
If the shouts and screams of Joanne and Siobhan Girvan could be heard and were ignored that could constitute an act of collusion that encouraged or aided the Protestant rioters by turning a blind eye to their behaviour.
It might be found significant that it was only one of the back up officers who had no difficulty naming several of those present. This was a small community, and many of the civilians seemed to know the police. Was there a reluctance on the part of the police to name those present? If this is established, this could be found to amount to a collusive act that would assist the Protestant rioters
The scene was not identified and sealed off until after 7.00am. Forensic evidence was not collected until some hours, and in some cases, days, later. It will be remembered that the hospital phoned to advise of the gravity of Robert Hamill's injury about 4.35am. After that time this was no longer another minor Saturday brawl. This was a case of a serious assault. From that moment the scene should have been taped off and samples taken of the liquid, (blood or alcohol), near the location of Hamill and Girvan. Steps should have been taken to obtain the clothing of Robert Hamill and those identified at the scene as taking part in the assault. This may be the counsel of perfection. Yet the failure to take these steps may indicate a bias in the police force that could amount to institutional collusion.
The public inquiry may wish to explore the reasons for Mr J's release from the Land Rover even though someone at the scene told Constable E that he was "one of the ones" who assaulted Robert Hamill. Mr J was not arrested until 10 May 1997. Why was there not a more timely follow-up on this suspect and evidence that might be gathered from him? Once again this could be found to be no more than an error in judgment or it could be found to be a collusive act undertaken to assist the Protestant rioters.
Witness "A" gave her statement to Detective Inspector S in the presence of Mrs X. In that statement she related Mr O's account of Officer B's phone calls. Mrs X said nothing to rebut or contradict this account.
It was also Detective Inspector S who later took Mrs X's first statement in which she asserted that it was her husband, rather than Reserve Constable B, who called the Os at 8.37am on the morning of 27 April. There is a clear discrepancy or conflict between the statements of Witness "A" and Mrs X that should have appeared obvious to the Inspector. Yet, this was not followed up, and Mrs X's account, which exonerated Officer B, was simply accepted. This is something that that a public inquiry might wish to explore.
The blood on the collar and back of Robert Hamill's jacket, and bloodstains taken from the road at the junction of Thomas and Market Street might have revealed relevant evidence, had they been subject to proper forensic testing. These acts could be found to be no more than errors in judgment, mistakes made in the course of a very stressful incident or they could be found to be collusive acts or omissions undertaken to assist the Protestant rioters.
Perhaps taken individually some of the items set out under headings i to vii could not be found to be acts of collusion. However, taken in combination with each other and particularly with the alleged acts of Officer B, they are capable of supporting an inference of collusion. It is the cumulative effect of all these matters which must be taken into account in reaching a conclusion as to whether there is evidence of collusive acts committed by the police. The cumulative effect of the issues raised in headings i to vii combined with the alleged acts of Officer B convince me that there is sufficient evidence of police collusion to warrant the holding of a public inquiry.
As a result I must conclude that a Public inquiry should be held to review the actions of the police during the period just prior to the disturbance, during the course of the disturbance itself, and during the subsequent investigation into the murder of Robert Hamill.
I must note that this report has been completed without reference to papers filed with the Criminal Injuries Compensation Agency although they were requested some three months ago.
Apparently the agency obtained an opinion of counsel that the papers should only be released to me if the consent of the claimant or witnesses were obtained by the agency.
It would, of course, have been helpful to read that material. However, I am satisfied that although it may have supported my conclusions it would not change or vary them because they were based on other documents. It is simply not worth the time and expense involved to seek a judicial review of the decision to refuse access to the material no matter what view I might take of the legal opinion upon which it is based.
Cory Collusion Inquiry Report: Rosemary Nelson
[extract]
A. Conclusion with respect to the failure to protect Rosemary Nelson
1. Introduction
I am satisfied that there is evidence of collusion by Governmental Agencies in the murder of Rosemary Nelson that warrants holding a public inquiry.
For ease of reference, I will reproduce the definition of collusion that was stated earlier in this Report, and that I have applied in the Rosemary Nelson case.
2. Definition of collusion
[as for Finucane report]
How should collusion be defined for the purposes of this inquiry? Again it is essential that I observe that members of the public must have confidence in the actions of Government agencies whether they be the NIO, the Secretary of State or the police force. There cannot be public confidence in any Government agency that is guilty of collusion or connivance with regard to serious crimes. Because of the necessity for public confidence in the Government agencies, the definition of collusion must be reasonably broad when it is applied to these agencies. That is to say that they must not act collusively by ignoring or turning a blind eye to the wrongful acts of their servants or agents by supplying information to assist those servants or agents in their wrongful acts or by encouraging others to commit a wrongful act.
Any lesser definition would have the effect of condoning or even encouraging state involvement in crimes, thus shattering all public confidence in governmental agencies.
In determining whether there are indications of state collusion in the murder of Rosemary Nelson it is important to look at the issue from two perspectives. First it must be seen whether the documents indicate that the action or inaction of the government agencies might have directly contributed to the killing of Rosemary Nelson. Secondly it is necessary to examine collusive acts which may have indirectly contributed to the killing by generally facilitating terrorist activities. That is the evidence may reveal a pattern of behaviour by a Government agency that comes within the definition of collusion. This evidence may add to and form part of the cumulative effect which emerges from a reading of the documents. In this case it will be important to consider whether the documents reveal that Government agents or government agencies turned a blind eye to threats which were being made against the life of Rosemary Nelson. It must be determined whether the failure of Government agencies to protect Rosemary Nelson, in light of the threats that they were aware of, constituted collusion. If the Government knew that Rosemary Nelson's life was in danger, yet took no steps to ensure her safety, this could constitute collusion. State sponsored protection was available to individuals on a discretionary basis. Obviously if this protection could have saved Rosemary Nelson's life, the failure of Government officials to provide it was an act or omission that could have facilitated her murder by terrorist paramilitaries.
Further, if it is found that acts of Government encouraged terrorist acts, this too could be found to be collusive action.
3. State conduct that is capable of constituting collusion
The following is a summary of those acts and omissions on the part of the RUC and NIO that are capable of giving rise to a finding of collusion. As with all summaries, it suffers from the effects of compression, and must be read together with the document as a whole in order to be properly understood. This may be somewhat repetitious but may provide a helpful outline.
Although these actions after the murder cannot standing alone constitute collusive acts, they may be seen as a part of a cumulative pattern of conduct which could be found to be collusive.