Friday-Monday, 23-26 November, 2001
Monday, 26 November, 2001
Tuesday-Thursday, 27-29 November, 2001
Friday-Monday, 30 November-3 December, 2001
Sunday, 2 December, 2001
Tuesday-Thursday, 4-6 December, 2001
Friday, 7 December, 2001
Friday-Sunday, 7-9 December, 2001
Monday, 10 December, 2001
Wednesday, 12 December, 2001
Thursday, 13 December, 2001
Press releases:
Sunday, 16 December, 2001
Friday-Monday, 23-26 November, 2001
Finucane Murder Case collapses, more delays seen
Cynicism and little surprise greeted the news Monday that the trial of the only man charged with the murder of Belfast human rights lawyer Pat Finucane 12 years ago collapsed today.
British forces are universally believed to have acted in concert with a loyalist death squad to carry out the killing of a man they depicted as an "IRA lawyer".
But after the prosecution said that they would be offering no evidence in the case, a formal verdict of not guilty was returned against loyalist William Stobie.
The case was withdrawn after the Director of Public Prosecutions said it was concerned about the mental state of the key witness, former British government press officer and journalist Neil Mulholland.
Mr Finucane was shot dead in front of his family in his North Belfast home in 1989. Stobie, a self confessed loyalist quartermaster and RUC police informer, supplied and disposed of the weapons used by the gang. He also admitted knowing the identity of the gang members who carried out the shooting.
Working as an agent for RUC Special Branch, Stobie said he informed his handlers at least twice of an imminent loyalist attack and identified the gang involved just prior to the killing.
Crucially, over a decade ago, in a statement to Mulholland, Stobie is believed to have admitted knowing Pat Finucane was the intended target. Shortly after making this admission, Stobie was arrested and interrogated by RUC Special Branch but released without charge. He has since denied knowing Finucane was the target.
The collapse of the case also meant a not guilty verdict being returned on Stobie over the murder of Protestant Adam Lambert in 1987. The student was working during his holidays on a north Belfast building site when he was killed by loyalist gunmen who mistook him for a Catholic.
Commenting on the decision to abandon the case, Hugh Orde, the police commissioner who had been in day-to-day control of the current investigation by British police chief John Stevens, insisted his officers had carried out a thorough investigation into the Finucane case.
But in a statement folliwng the trial's collapse, the Finucane family was scathing.
"The trial of Stobie was never a truth seeking process," they said. "We have maintained that the Stevens investigation and the prosecution of Stobie was a delaying tactic to thwart the establishment of a public inquiry. The Stevens investigation has delayed a public inquiry by at least 3 years, so it has served its purpose."
And they dismissed the announcement of a fresh judicial investigation as another delaying tactic to avoid a full public inquiry.
It was revealed that "a judge of international standing" would be appointed by April next year to conduct an investigation into the murder, and others in which there is evidence of Crown force collusion.
The Finucanes said the appointment would delay a public inquiry for another 4 to 5 years because the judge would be asked to review the evidence of half a dozen complex cases.
They insisted: "Justice demands that Tony Blair should announce the establishment of a public inquiry now.
"No amount of political deal making will dilute the family's entitlement to this very basic human right, the right to truth."
Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams MP has backed calls for a full public judicial inquiry into the Finucane killing. He said the collapse of the trial was predictable.
"From the beginning the British system and in particular the intelligence services responsible for collusion and the running of agents within the loyalist death squads, have used every means available to them to prevent the truth from emerging around Pat Finucane's case and hundreds of other similar killings.
"It is also clear that the [Director of Public Prosecutions] was reluctant to pursue a case which would have exposed the complicity of that office in preventing the full facts from becoming public.
"Sinn Fein supports the family in their demand for a full public judicial inquiry. This is the only real mechanism now available for uncovering the truth."
Statement on behalf of the Finucane Family
We are not surprised by the collapse of the Stobie trial. The trial of Stobie was never a truth seeking process. We have maintained that the Stevens investigation and the prosecution of Stobie was a delaying tactic to thwart the establishment of a public inquiry. The Stevens investigation has delayed a public inquiry by at least 3 years, so it has served its purpose.
The appointment of a judge to review the evidence surrounding the circumstances of Pat’s murder will delay a public inquiry for another 4 to 5 years since it has been proposed that the judge will review the evidence of half a dozen complicated cases.
The appointment of a judge is another delaying tactic. Justice demands that Tony Blair should announce the establishment of a public inquiry now. No amount of political deal making will dilute the family’s entitlement to this very basic human right, the right to truth.
Tuesday-Thursday, 27-29 November, 2001
Collusion link to journalist's Killing
Journalist Martin O'Hagan was set to expose an RUC Special Branch officer's collusion with a notorious loyalist killer when he was shot dead in Lurgan in September, it has been revealed.
The Sunday World journalist was researching material for a book on Portadown gunman Robin Jackson, known as 'The Jackal'. Jackson, who died of cancer in the mid 1990s, has been linked to numerous murders of Catholics in the Mid-Ulster area by the paramilitary UVF.
While researching his latest book, O'Hagan discovered evidence that suggested two senior RUC police officers and a prominent member of the Protestant Orange Order had supplied notorious loyalist killer Billy Wright with false alibis in relation to three separate incidents. According to the information unearthed by O'Hagan, the RUC supplied a cover story for Wright in connection with the UVF shooting of four men in Cappagh County Tyrone in March 1991.
An alibi was also provided to cover Wright's involvement in the 1994 killing of pensioner Rose Anne Mallon in Dungannon and after an attempted assassination of former Sinn Fein Councillor Brendan Curran in March 1990.
Collusion has always been suspected in these controversial killings. As an isolated nationalist village, Cappagh was an unlikely place for a loyalist attack without Crown force collusion. A surveillance camera trained onto Rose Anne Mallon's home was found in a hedge by her family just days after she was shot dead.
One of the RUC officers involved in the cover up is believed to have been Billy Wright's handler. As with many other cases of collusion involving Crown force handlers and their loyalist agents, the picture emerging is one of state murder by proxy.
O'Hagan was shot dead as he walked home with his wife Marie on Friday 25 September. The journalist identified and named one of his killers just moments before he died. The current leader of the LVF, a breakaway loyalist paramilitary group founded by Billy Wright, is suspected of taking part in the killing.
As part of his research into collusion, O'Hagan had approached a close associate of this man in Lurgan. The man he approached, known as a drug dealer and suspected MI5 agent, is now also a suspect in the killing.
This man, his brother, another associate and a loyalist hitman from Dungannon are suspected of carrying out the killing. O'Hagan identified one of the gang before he died as the same man whom had threatened him just four nights earlier.
Concerns that the investigation into the journalist's death is being deliberately hampered by the RUC, now known as the PSNI, and MI5's protection of an agent have been raised with the United Nations Special Rapporteur Abid Hussein. Spokesperson for British Irish Rights Watch, Jane Winters, said the group had asked the UN special rapporteur to forward a copy of the report to the British government.
Friday-Monday, 30 November-3 December, 2001
Nelson's murderous past ignored
British Army/UDA double agent Brian Nelson has admitted knowledge of eight different murders in the Eighties, according to reports today. His admissions are contained in documents which have long been in state hands, yet no attempt has ever been made to investigate the claims.
The revelations come from part of a journal which Nelson wrote while being held awaiting trial in Belfast's Crumlin Road jail in 1990.
It reveals that the British army agent admitted knowledge of eight murders, two attempted murders and conspiracy to murder on 36 other occasions.
Nelson admits he was either involved in the murders or was made aware of them as the most senior intelligence officer of the loyalist paramilitary UDA from 1984 to 1990.
These were: Michael Power, a father of three; pensioner Francisco Notarantonio; Jack Kielty, father of comedian Patrick Kielty; Terry McDaid, a farther of two; Gerard Slane, a father of three; Jimmy Craig, a loyalist accused of passing on information to republicans; Pat Finucane, a human rights lawyer; and Laughlin Maginn, a father of four.
Nelson's role as an agent for British military intelligence has long been at the centre of allegations that the state colluded in the murder of nationalists.
Nelson infiltrated the UDA at the behest of military intelligence in 1985. With a steady supply of information and contacts with the British military, he was moved into the key position as the UDA's leading intelligence officer less than three months later.
Nelson was eventually arrested in 1990 and subsequently charged with 34 separate offences, including the murders of Terence McDaid and Gerard Slane.
But when the case came to court the next year the murder charges and many other serious offences were dropped.
Nelson's decision to plead guilty meant that no evidence of state collusion was made public He was sentenced to 10 years but served only five years in an English jail and has since been in hiding.
NOT SURPRISED
The widow of Terry McDaid said she was not surprised by the latest revelations. Mr McDaid, a father of two, was killed after two masked men burst into the living room of his north Belfast home and shot him several times. He died a short time later in hospital.
Maura McDaid, who was in the living room when her husband was shot, said only a full independent inquiry will unearth the truth about alleged state collusion with loyalist paramilitaries in the murder of Catholics.
"I have known for a long time about Brian Nelson's involvement in the murder of Terry," she said.
"Brian Nelson warned British intelligence that they (loyalists) were going to murder the wrong man and nothing was done about it."
Nelson was tried in 1992 on five charges of conspiracy to murder but charges of murdering Terry McDaid and Gerard Slane were dramatically dropped.
"British intelligence and the MoD were involved in murders and covered it up with Brian Nelson's trial and are still covering it up with one lie after the other," said Mrs McDaid.
She said the latest revelations on the extent of Nelson's activities as a British military intelligence agent and senior UDA officer, confirmed her suspicions about the former spy.
"Everyday I wake up praying to God that there will be an full independent inquiry into each of these murders," said Mrs McDaid.
"I am very angry and frustrated that I have to live my life without justice. Everyday is a nightmare and you just don't know what is going to happen next.
"For my own sanity and the sanity of my children the truth must come out. I don't feel Terry can rest in peace until the truth is told."
Pat Finucane's brother Martin said last night: "You have to ask yourself why none of this evidence was ever acted upon and was kept secret for so long.
"It is clear to our family and the families of a lot of other people who were killed in controversial circumstances that the state's hands are not and never have been clean."
Stobie gave RUC Finucane details
By Ed Moloney, Sunday Tribune
Last Monday the trial of UDA double agent William Stobie collapsed bringing demands for a public inquiry into the assassination of Belfast lawyer Pat Finucane. Ed Moloney recalls the controversial shooting.
Pat Finucane was sitting down to dinner with his wife Geraldine and three children on Sunday evening, February 12th, 1989 in their Antrim Road home when it happened. Geraldine remembers the shooting - "a bang followed by blood and horror" - as having taken place between 7.25 and 7.30 pm. Two hooded gunmen were involved, one using an automatic rifle, the other carrying a 9mm Browning pistol. One bullet from the rifle was fired at Finucane but the killing was done with the pistol. All 13 bullets in the magazine were pumped into his body. The story of Pat Finucane’s death began nearly a week before the horrific events at his home when the UDA quarter-master in its notorious ‘C’ Company district in North Belfast, William Stobie was summoned by his commander and told to provide guns for an operation that was being planned. Stobie believes it was the Monday or Tuesday before the killing.
Notes made during a 1990 interview with Stobie by this reporter record the following account of what happened next: "He (Stobie) brought along a Heckler and Koch but the commander said that wasn’t good enough - an H & K only holds 9 rounds - he wanted a Browning 9mm because it has 13 bullets. Assassins prefer more bullets because (of the) better chance of hitting (the) target.
"Commander told him: ‘This is for a special job, we’re going to hit a top Provie’. He phoned the SB (Special Branch) and told them all (of the) above - he said he didn’t tell them it was Finucane because he didn’t know, only that it was a top Provie. He said that the commander was well known to the cops and that they would have known that at most two teams under him would have been tasked with the killing - all would have been known to the cops - included well known characters like McK, S, GK, KL and WD."
That three way exchange between Stobie, his UDA commander and the RUC Special Branch was destined to form the basis of one of the most controversial legal confrontations in the history of the Northern Troubles, a confrontation which culminated last week in the dramatic collapse of efforts to convict Stobie of the Finucane murder.
It would, with time, also add volatile evidence to an already damning case against the British security authorities which at worst alleged that Finucane had been killed through direct and deliberate collusion between one or more branches of intelligence and the UDA or, at the least, by their negligence.
That Finucane had earned the hostility of the British security establishment is beyond doubt. As a criminal lawyer he had specialised in defending Provisional IRA clients and had particularly irritated the authorities by the way he defended IRA suspects in supergrass cases during the earky 1980's.
He had pioneered the use of judicial review to challenge aspects of British security policy and at one point, much to the anger of RUC detectives, used a court action to free the Belfast Commander of the IRA from Castlereagh holding centre mid-way through an interrogation. Security figures repeatedly alleged in private that if he was not in the Provisional IRA then his family connections were such as to make him the next best thing. When they repeated these allegations to Loyalist gunmen then Pat Fuinucane's fate was sealed.
In the weeks before his death there was plenty of evidence of this hostility. A junior minister in the British Home Office, Douglas Hogg told MP’s that some lawyers in Belfast were close to the IRA and everyone knew that he meant Pat Finucane. RUC detectives also repeatedly told UDA suspects they were interrogating at Castlereagh that they were assassinating the wrong people and should instead target three lawyers, whom they named. One was Pat Finucane.
Stobie joined the Ulster Defence Association when the Loyalist group was at the height of its popularity in Protestant Belfast, in the early 1970’s. Like many others in his situation he had no difficulty combining membership of a violent Loyalist paramilitary group with a part-time commission in the Ulster Defence Regiment. Not until he was convicted and given a suspended sentence for arms offences in 1987 did the authorities insist he sever his connectuons with the UDR
Stobie was a low level member of the UDA for most of his paramilitary career but by the time of the Pat Finucane killing he had risen to become the organisation’s quarter-master in the Glencairn district of North Belfast, home of some of the city’s toughest Loyalist gunmen. As such he was responsible for supplying the UDA’s local murder squads with weapons.
He enjoyed the job and delighted in thinking up new ways of hiding the UDA’s weapons caches from the prying eyes of the security forces. With a grin he once told me that his favourite trick was to break into neighbours’ apartments when they were away and hide guns in their attics. That way he could be sure he was the only one to know where they were hidden.
Stobie had another even darker secret. From late 1987 onwards he had been living a double life as an agent for the RUC Special Branch. Like so many other informers he had been blackmailed into working for the police after they learned of his involvement in a murder.
Stobie told this reporter that he had been part of the UDA team which on November 9th, 1987 had shot dead a 19 year old Co Fermanagh Protestant called Adam Lambert at a building site in the Highfield area of North Belfast not far from Stobie’s home. The previous weekend had seen the IRA slaughter at the cenotaph in Enniskillen and the UDA was looking for Catholics to kill in revenge. Someone said that Lambert with his strange country accent must be a Catholic and so he was chosen to die.
Stobie provided the getaway van used by the gunmen and the weapons which cut Lambert down. But afterwards one of the UDA team confessed everything to RUC detectives and told in detail the story of Stobie’s involvement. Stobie was arrested and put under pressure by the Special Branch to work for them. The RUC couldn’t prove the charge but, as he put it at the time "the Branch were leaning very heavily on me".
On the Sunday afternoon/evening of February 12th, the day of Pat Finucane’s death, Stobie delivered the guns that were to be used to kill him to the UDA hit-team. The rendezvous was the Highfield Glasgow Rangers supporters club and the tell tale signs were there that the ‘hit’ was imminent.
Notes of that 1990 interview with Stobie record: "...he saw S, McK and K along with three others in the club - all are heavy drinkers but that evening they were only drinking Coke - this was a sure sign that something was on because they only drink Coke when they’re on a job."
He then saw three of them get into a van and realised they were beginning the operation. He headed to his Forthriver Road flat, stopping for a brief visit to his mother en route and as soon as he reached home phoned his Special Branch handler to tell them what he had just seen. He remembers this as happening between 7pm and 7.30 pm.
It is a moot point as to whether Stobie’s Sunday evening phone call to his RUC handlers was made in time to have stopped the shooting of Pat Finucane - but only if that was the only piece of information available to the RUC. The evidence from Stobie’s prior contact with the Special Branch on the Monday or Tuesday is that altogether the police did have, or should have had enough information to have saved Finucane’s life.
According to Stobie’s account the RUC Special Branch knew, thanks to his tip-off’s, three vital elements in the days before Pat Finucane was killed. These were:
Yet, according to Stobie, he was given no special instructions by his handlers to inform them of developments as they unfolded nor, as has happened in many IRA operations, did the Special Branch make any attempt to bug the weapons so they could track the killers’ every move.
More alarming are two more allegations from Stobie. The first was that even if his Sunday call was too late to stop the shooting from happening it was not too late to apprehend the gunmen on their way back from the killing while fresh forensic, ballistics and weapons evidence was still on them.
The second sensational allegation is that the Special Branch, acting on Stobie’s information, mounted a covert operation several days after Finucane’s death during which they calmly watched the principal murder weapon being safely disposed of by the UDA commander in charge of the Finucane operation.
After the killings the two murder weapons, the Heckler and Koch and the Browning were delivered to a safe house in Loyalist North Belfast. The house, ironically, was in the same street as the home of the UDA commander.
On the Tuesday after the killing Stobie picked up the guns and on the following day he arranged to hand the Browning, the hottest of the two weapons, over to the UDA commander who then drove the gun over to another part of North Belfast where it was stashed in a safe house.
In July that year three young Shankill Road men, none of them involved in the Finucane killing, were charged with possessing two weapons one of which was the Browning pistol used to end Pat Finucane’s life.
It may be that they were arrested and charged because the police knew precisely where the Browning had been secreted. According to Stobie, the information he gave Special Branch meant that the RUC was fully aware of the pistol’s journey across Belfast.
His account of this episode, according to notes made nine years ago, reads: "...arranged for McK to pick up the Browning on Wednesday - met McK who had arrived in landrover at local shops, handed gun over and McK then did a car switch- - he (Stobie) said he phoned SB (Special Branch) before McK arrived and after McK picked up gun - but cops did nothing except to set up a roadblock on Forthriver Road - made no apparent attempt to track or arrest McK. He believes they could have picked up the gun and arrested McK."
Afterwards the UDA commander complained that throughout the journey a British Army helicopter appeared to shadow his car. In retrospect Stobie suspected the RUC roadblock, a landrover straddled across the road, was there just to observe, not to act. Whatever the reason for the inaction the result was the same: the killers of Pat Finucane had got clean away with their crime.
Copyright © 2001 Sunday Tribune
Tuesday-Thursday, 4-6 December, 2001
Furore over RUC's Knowledge of Omagh bomb
RUC Special Branch police did not act to prevent the 1998 Omagh bombing despite having advance knowledge of the attack, it has been confirmed.
The Special Branch, the notorious 'force within a force', also failed to pass on its information to senior police in the area, according to an investigation by police Ombudsman Nuala O'Loan.
Her report is scathing of the RUC's investigation into the attack which took place on August 15th, 1998. The bomb killed 29 people, including a woman pregnant with twins, and injured over 200.
'Kevin Fulton', a double-agent spying on the activities of the so-called 'Real IRA', had provided his handlers with clear information which could have prevented the attack. For reasons still unclear, his information was not acted on.
The Ombudsman is critical of the way the tip-off was treated and of the fact that intelligence was not passed to uniformed RUC men in the town. She says the atrocity might have been averted had police checkpoints been in place.
In July this year, 'Fulton' blew the whistle on his handlers. His revelations, first published by the Sunday People newspaper, were ignored by the mainstream media. But the accounts prompted the Police Ombudsman to mount an investigation, and she was bitterly criticised by unionists for even questioning the RUC's actions.
Now a leaked account of her report, apparently affirming Fulton's account and including other revelations, has created a storm of protest and led to demands for a public inquiry.
It is known that the Special Branch has in the past allowed or encouraged some paramilitary attacks to proceed to protect the identity of its informers or for military and propoganda purposes. Relatives of those killed in the 1972 loyalist attacks on Dublin and Monaghan have suggested they were the victims of such an action.
Concerns that this may also be the case in the Omagh attack continue to mount. They have not been alleviated today by the dismissals, denials and outright defiance of RUC Chief Ronnie Flanagan.
Amid renewed pressure for a full public inquiry into the history of Special Branch collusion with loyalist death squads, British Secretary of State John Reid is under intense pressure to do something about an agency which operates under a cloak of secrecy.
But in a series of television interviews, Reid has again chosen to shoot the messenger and shred the message. Relatives of those killed at Omagh, while still placing the blame on the dissident republicans who carried out the attack, are now coming forward to tell of their disgust and anger and to demand a full, public inquiry.
Stanley McCombe, whose wife Ann was killed in the bomb, said: "It's unbelievable that if they had information they couldn't act on it, if what I'm hearing is true." Michael Gallagher, whose son Aidan also died, said: "When we meet next week and hear the ombudsman's full report, we will then come together and discuss how we move things forward. I just hope at the end of this process, the Omagh victims and their families will get justice."
Laurence Rushe, whose wife was killed in the bomb, has said the revelations back his claims that the RUC allowed the bomb to explode and are currently engaged in a cover-up over the incident.
TIP-OFF
In his account published in August, 'Fulton' said he tipped off the Special Branch in advance about the location of the bomb materials destined for Omagh, and the identity of one of those involved in the attack. He also alleged that Special Branch and 26-County Garda police were informed in advance about the car used to transport the bomb to Omagh.
Tapes of conversations between 'Fulton' and his handler earlier this year appear to confirm the Special Branch was informed of the attack. According to a transcript of one tape, which was passed to the Ombudsman's office, Fulton can be heard asking his handler whether he recalled the warning he had passed on before the Omagh bomb was planted.
In the cagey conversation, the handler replies: "I vaguely remember, but I'd have to check my notes... I remember something... I do remember bits and pieces."
According to Fulton, he met the man alleged to have constructed the bomb on the Thursday before the attack, but this man was never questioned by the RUC.
Fulton has also said that he told the detective leading the Omagh investigation about his warnings three months after the attack and even showed him the site where the bomb was made, but was never asked to give a statement.
The revelations have led to conflicting resignation demands, with nationalists calling on Flanagan to go, while unionists are demanding that Ombudsman O'Loan resign her post. But efforts to clean up the image of the discredited RUC (now renamed the PSNI) have been set back by the revelations, and demands for the full implementation of policing reforms and the disbandment of the Special Branch are now louder than ever.
'STATE OF SHOCK'
Sinn Fein West Tyrone MP Pat Doherty MLA has demanded an urgent meeting with the British Secretary of State John Reid to ensure full disclosure of all the information relating to the revelations.
Mr Doherty said people in Omagh were in "a state of shock". He said the first priority was to ensure that they are "not left in the dark" about the extent of prior knowledge withheld by the RUC Special Branch.
"This community is still in the process of rebuilding, what they do not need is uncertainty and untruths to complicate the healing process.
"I am demanding a meeting with John Reid and I will be asking for full disclosure of all the information.
"The concern would be that if a bomb attack like that in Omagh were to happen again tomorrow and if the Policing Board were to ask for information that Ronnie Flanagan could block access to full details of Special Branch operations. In a tragic way this shows up the flaws in the current policing board.
"The Special Branch, Ronnie Flanagan and those who control the Special Branch are still there. These are the people who were in the position to avert this catastrophe. These people stood back and let 29 innocent people and 2 unborn children die. They must be removed immediately followed by an full independent investigation into the matter."
Collusion - Britains's Involvement in the murder of Pat Finucane
In light of the recent collapse of the Stobie case and further revelations about the role of Brian Nelson Sinn Fein reiterates our support for the demand for an International Public Judicial Inquiry into the murder of Pat Finucane and other related cases will not go away.
William Stobie was an RUC Special Branch Agent, Brian Nelson was a British Army agent, both were active members of the UDA and have admitted to involvement in a series of murders. In Brian Nelson's case Colonel 'J' the head of FRU gave evidence in his support and the British Defence Secretary and former Secretary of State Tom King submitted a mitigation plea to the Nelson trial in 1992 on behalf of Nelson who he described as a 'valuable agent'.
Collusion between the British and the loyalist death squads spanned all of their organisations - the RUC, the UDR/RIR, MI5, the UDA, UVF, Ulster Resistance and others and of course the British Army through FRU.
Sinn Fein fully supports the families of victims who are calling for International Public Judicial Inquiries into the deaths of their loved ones.
During the Weston Park talks our party made clear our opposition to the proposal of the two government's to appoint an international judge to investigate allegations of collusion in a number of specified cases. In fact Sinn Fein refused to make these high profile cases a matter for bargaining in negotiations on policing. We viewed the proposal to appoint a judge as a cynical attempt to long finger the demand for an Independent Public Judicial Inquiry.
Sinn Fein presented Tony Blair with this document four years ago. He has also read the various reports produced by Stalker, Sampson and Stevens. So he and his colleagues are aware of these matters. They are also no doubt aware that this is not a case of a few bad apples. This is an example of the out-workings of a structured strategy by the British government and its agencies.
Pat Finucane was killed as a matter of British policy.
"John Stevens told us he knew 'beyond a shadow of a doubt' who was responsible
"He also said he knows the truth about Brian Nelson and 'the full facts concerning his involvement in collusion and murders'"
- Report of the International Human Rights Working Party for the Law Society of England and Wales. (A 1995 report into the murder of Pat Finucane)
INTRODUCTION
In the north of Ireland citizens are compelled under emergency legislation and at the point of British guns to provide details about themselves. The details relating to nationalists and republicans are computerised, filed and passed on to loyalist paramilitaries.
Thousands of such files have been handed over to loyalist murder gangs by serving members of the British army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary.
Not a single member of the RUC the primary source for security and intelligence documents was charged as a result of the official inquiry into such collusion the Stevens Inquiry. Such files continue to be leaked to this day.
The man responsible for a period of several years, for collating the information thus provided and targeting individuals for assassination by loyalist murder gangs was British military intelligence agent Brian Nelson. Nelson was a member of the British Army and given a leading role in loyalist assassinations of nationalist and republicans and others who were considered to be enemies of British rule in Ireland.
He was assisted in his deadly work by British Military intelligence who weeded out his files so as to make them more selective, provided him with addresses of targets and a car to conduct his surveillance activities.
He was directed in the supply of modern arms from South Africa to loyalist groups in an increased loyalist assassination campaign at a period in which killings by the RUC and British army were coincidentally reduced.
Nelson played a very important role in all of this. He is undoubtedly culpable. But the major culpability rests with his controllers and with those in political authority at the highest levels of the British political, military and legal system who moved decisively and effectively to reduce the effect of their responsibility by concealing the facts.
The political and moral enormity of what is involved is surpassed by the toll in human lives and suffering inflicted. The precise overall number of fatalities resulting from collusion between British forces and the loyalist murder gangs over a period of 25 years is unknown. But what is for certain is this. In the six years before the arrival of the South African weapons, from January 1982 to December 1987 loyalist murder gangs killed 71 people. In the six years following, from January 1988 to 1 September 1994, loyalist killed 229 people.
DEFINING COLLUSION
In the context of the north of Ireland the term collusion has come to embrace a number of illegal activities on the part of the British forces the British army, the RUC and the intelligence services. These include:
Various organs of the British state, such as the Attorney General, the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, have:
AN APPALLING VISTA
To borrow a phrase from Lord Denning, a senior member of the British judiciary, in relation to the Birmingham Six defence at their trial; what has been stated above represents an appalling vista. The facts documented below bear this out.
Justice for the Birmingham Six and their families took 16 years to secure. This dossier deals with only a very narrow band of the full spectrum of the whole issue of collusion yet it involves a demand for justice for a thousand relatives of hundreds of victims of the Nelson affair. Justice cannot wait another 16 years. This appalling vista must be laid bare now.
There is nothing new in this dossier nor does it purport to represent all that is in the public domain in relation to the subject matter. But what is clear is that it is wholly unacceptable that the often publicly stated serious allegations it contains should go uninvestigated, that the truth remains concealed and that those responsible are not held publicly accountable for their actions.
NELSON: PANORAMA'S RESEARCH
In June 1992, two and a half years after his arrest and four months after Brian Nelson's trial the BBC's Panorama broadcast a programme on the Nelson affair.
The Panorama teams researches had secured a prison journal Nelson had written in the previous twelve months.
Nelson's prison journal was a mainstay to the programmes research. Many of the claims made by the programme are indeed based on this.
The main points of the Panorama teams research state that:
It goes on to say:
THE KILLING OF PAT FINUCANE
"There is credible evidence of both police and army involvement. We cite the most significant items below. There is further evidence in the hands of the police which we have not been given access.
"...the Government told the UN Special rapporteur that the DPP directed that there should be no prosecution against any officer in connection with Patrick Finucane's death. Significantly the Government did not deny that there was collusion by the government or the security forces in relation to the murder.
"The following threats were made against Patrick Finucane by RUC officers
"Our understanding is that none of these allegations has been investigated by the police, let alone tested in court. DS (Detective Sergeant RUC) Simpson told the inquest that some of them were investigated by the Stevens inquiry. John Stevens told us that as far as he could remember they were not. It is wholly wrong in our view that such allegations should remain unexamined.
"Since the inquest two British army officers have admitted army participation in the UDA murder plot that involved Patrick Finucane. The context of each admission is very different one in a television programme and one on oath in Court. Yet they are both credible. Together they raise serious questions which require further investigation.
(i). Admissions by Brian Nelson
Brian Nelson was a British army intelligence officer who was placed in the UDA in 1987. He is currently serving prison sentences arising out of his involvement, while acting as an intelligence officer, in other terrorist murders. (Note: Nelson is now a free man. This 1995 report predates Nelson's release in 1996).
His admissions to involvement in the Finucane murder were transmitted in a BBC Panorama programme on 8 June 1992.
He claimed:
(ii). Admissions by a British Army colonel known as "J".
Colonel J gave evidence on oath at Belfast Crown Court in mitigation for Brian Nelson. He said:
"We received no evidence that Patrick Finucane was warned that he was a target for assassination.
"We asked the DPP, his deputy and John Stevens about the Panorama allegations. If Panorama was right. Nelson had admitted to conspiracy to murder Patrick Finucane. How then could there not be sufficient evidence to prosecute him? They said they could not comment on individual cases. However they indicated that the full journal was not in police hands.
"We note that in spite of his admission on oath. Colonel J has not been prosecuted.
"John Stevens told us he knew beyond a shadow of a doubt who was responsible for the murder. He also said he knows the truth about Brian Nelson and the full facts concerning his involvement in collusion and murders.
"We do not. The public does not.
"While the facts are not disclosed by the police and known to the public only through television, they remain untested, the murderers remain unpunished, the allegations of collusion persist, and a cloud remains hanging, not just over the legal profession, but over the system of justice itself.
A thorough, wider investigation is required!
Reference to the latter in particular, statements by the British authorities repudiating the existence of a shoot-to-kill policy by British forces are not substantiated by evidence of an official will
BRIAN NELSON
Allegations of Collusion between British forces and Loyalist Paramilitaries:
NELSON'S ROLE EMERGES
The Stevens inquiry did not look at the issue of collusion as a whole but was restricted rather to leaks of security documents at the time and related matters. It did not look at evidence that collusion between members of the British forces and loyalist paramilitaries had been going on for many years or at the overall pattern as it related to both targeted and random killings of catholics. It did not look at the British authorities record during this time in bringing criminal proceedings against British forces personnel in this regard.
THE TRIAL
Due Process and Brian Nelson
"The trial of UDA intelligence chief Brian Nelson revealed that a very high level of information on both loyalist personnel and operations was held by the army and the RUC. The trial also obliquely highlighted that little was done to disrupt these operations, to save lives, to dismantle loyalist groups and to take severe measures to deter known collusion in the passing of security information. Brian Nelson's military handlers who allegedly provided information which assisted in targeting some individuals for murder, were not charged with any offence."
NELSON AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMS
CONCLUSION
John Stevens told the authors of the report cited at the beginning of this dossier that he knew the 'full facts concerning Brian Nelson's involvement in collusion and murders.'
The public does not. This needs to be urgently redressed.
Amnesty International in its report Political Killings in Northern Ireland provides a succinct summary of what is involved.
"The trial of UDA intelligence chief Brian Nelson revealed that a very high level of information on both loyalist personnel and operations was held by the army and the RUC. The trial also obliquely highlighted that little was done to disrupt these operations, to save lives, to dismantle loyalist groups and to take severe measures to deter known collusion in the passing of security information. Brian Nelson's military handlers who allegedly provided information which assisted in targeting some individuals for murder, were not charged with any offence."
The claims by Brian Nelson place him at the centre of the wider picture which needs to be the subject of a comprehensive public and independent inquiry. That is, collusion between British forces and loyalist paramilitaries including a full investigation of the shipment of South African arms used to rearm the loyalist paramilitaries in the late 1980s.
The latter resulted in the deaths of 229 people between January 1988 and September 1994. Justice for the victims and relatives must be comprehensively and urgently addressed.
This matter, too, has a direct bearing on the current peace process.
The 'decommissioning' issue was deliberately erected by the government of John Major and the unionist parties as a tactical device to prevent the commencement of negotiations, to keep Sinn Fein out of the talks and to delay the start of the substantive phase of the talks.
Sinn Fein's position on this issue is simple and straightforward. We want to see the removal of all the guns from Irish politics; the disarming of all armed groups to the conflict British, loyalist and republicans. That has to be an objective of the peace process.
In this the Sinn Fein position goes much further than the remit with which the two governments tasked the International Body. This was to take into consideration only those guns held by paramilitary organisations. That said, it is clear that even this narrow, and therefore incomplete, focus cannot be fully considered unless the full extent of the role of the British military and intelligence agencies in arming loyalist paramilitaries is laid bare as part of that consideration.
In particular the role of the British security and intelligence apparatus supported politically and legally at the highest levels of the British government in arming the UDA, the UVF and Ulster Resistance through the activities of British Intelligence agent Brian Nelson must be fully exposed.
There is clearly a direct linkage from the British government, through its military and intelligence apparatus, intelligence agent Brian Nelson to the loyalist paramilitaries and the 229 murders perpetrated by the latter after they received the shipment of South African guns in January 1988.
APPENDIX
Ginger Baker
Allegations of collusion between British forces and loyalist paramilitaries have been made since the early 1970s. No independent public inquiry has ever been conducted.
Former British soldier Ginger Baker was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment for killing 4 catholics in the early 70s. Baker has consistently claimed that the RUC members drove weapons through checkpoints, regularly gave RUC files to the UDA and tipped off loyalists to prevent the seizure of their weapons.
On 27 September 1989 the Irish News received a letter from Baker stating that he had been in contact with the Stevens Inquiry. Shortly before this Baker had claimed that an RUC officer was second in command of a UDA battalion in 1972 73. Baker claimed he has vital evidence and can name RUC officers who passed information to loyalist paramilitaries in the early 70s.
In his letter from Long Lartin prison Baker stated:
"In a telephone call from this prison on Friday 22nd September, I informed a female member of John Stevens investigative team that on returning to Northern Ireland I would name the RUC moles."
Collusion between security forces and loyalist extremists in Northern Ireland has always existed. I can prove this absolutely. However the terrible truth which I can reveal may well result in another cover-up.
A spokesperson for the Stevens Inquiry confirmed that Baker had contacted them. When asked if the inquiry would interview Baker the spokesperson replied: "What Mr Baker has told us is being considered by senior officers and a decision will be made."
Nothing more has been publicly heard of the matter.
Baker was, however, speedily transferred to Ireland. Later he was transferred to England again and released in February 1992 from Frankland Prison.
The Baker era of the early 70s heralded an unbroken chain of events ever since of allegations and proof of British forces collusion with loyalist paramilitaries. This has been documented in court cases, newspaper stories and television documentaries over the past twenty-five years.
However, no comprehensive public independent inquiry has ever taken place.
Friday-Sunday, 7-9 December, 2001
RUC Double-Agents behind Omagh bomb - Claim
New reports indicate the RUC's notorious Special Branch may have known about the Omagh bomb plan since its inception, and one or more agents may have worked to construct and/or transport the device.
Twenty-nine civilians and two unborn children died on August 15, 1998, when a large device exploded in the heart of Omagh town's business district as the wrong area was being evacuated.
Speculation has mounted ahead of the planned publication on Wednesday by police Ombudsman Nuala O'Loan of her report. She is expected to strongly criticise the RUC for its inaction over warnings before the bombing and its 'investigation' afterwards.
O'Loan initiated the investigation after an RUC double-agent known as 'Kevin Fulton' presented hard evidence that he had given the RUC a clear warning about the impending attack, including the location of the bomb and the name of the bomb-maker.
It has since been alleged that the RUC's Special Branch may have allowed the bombing to take place in order to protect a key double-agent involved in the bombing and as part of its campaign against the so-called 'Real IRA', a dissident breakaway group.
The failure of Special Branch to inform local RUC police about the Fulton warning, and a second, earlier warning of a possible gun and rocket attack in Omagh on the same day, is being seen as key.
The RUC in Omagh were led to believe nothing was amiss. A simple checkpoint which could have interrupted the attack was not set up, and the bomb was simply driven into the town. Information on both warnings were later found to have been deleted from police files.
Fulton, who had provided information about previous 'Real IRA' attacks, later taped a telephone conversation with his RUC 'handler' in which the handler confirmed he had received a warning about a bomb being prepared. A transcript of this tape is published below.
Although it is understood that Wednesday's report will not suggest the Special Branch actively enabled the bombing, relatives are now demanding a public inquiry into the events leading up to the attack and the RUC's actions afterwards -- seen by some as a possible cover-up.
Flanagan has denied that the warning of a gun and rocket attack in Omagh on August 15th had nothing do with the Omagh bombing on the same day. He said the call 11 days before the bombing could not 'have remotely led to the interception of a bomb that was en route to Omagh', adding: 'I have no doubt that this call has absolutely nothing to do with the attack.' He did not comment on the Fulton warning, but British Secretary of State John Reid has defended the RUC and insisted nothing could have been done to prevent the bombing.
RUC Chief Ronnie Flanagan has been accused of spinning the leaks from the ombudsman's controversial report. Observers believe the leaks were disclosed by the force itself in order to soften the impact of the revelations.
Unionist MP accused Ms Nuala O'Loan of having walked through "police and community interests like a suicide bomber". The way the Ombudsman had handled the case and the conclusions she had drawn showed that she had "absolutely no experience", he told BBC television.
On the same programme, Sinn Fein vice-president and MP for the Omagh area, Mr Pat Doherty, said the findings suggested that action could have been taken to try and prevent the attack. The police's actions had all the hallmarks of a cover-up, he added.
"Special Branch must now be disbanded and those who failed to act on this information from the Chief Constable down should now be removed from the policing structures immediately."
On a visit to Omagh yesterday, Mr Doherty also criticised the John Reid for taking up "an entirely political position in defence of Special Branch in the face of overwhelming evidence". Dr Reid's position "blatantly undermined" the Good Friday Agreement, the Sinn Fein MP added.
------------
The following is a transcript of a taped conversation between double-agent Kevin Fulton and his RUC handler:
Kevin: Hello you boy ye' -- how you doin'?
Officer: Jesus [uses Kevin's real name], what about ye?
They make small talk.
Kevin: Do you remember the stuff I gave you about [names one of the alleged Omagh bombers]?
Officer: Oh yes, I do.
Kevin: Do you remember the night I phoned you about the jackets and stuff? [referring to bullet proof vests]
Officer: I remember you phoning that night.
Kevin: See I'm gonna have to give this info ... [The transcript is briefly discontinued at this point]
Kevin: But do you remember the whole thing anyway?
Officer: We don't always put everything in [meaning the forwarding of intelligence to senior RUC and military personnel], but I do remember bits and pieces.
Kevin: Do you remember about the Omagh thing and me meeting [name of Omagh bomber] in Dundalk? Do you remember I told you something big was gonna happen because [name of Omagh bomber] was mixing a bomb?
Officer: I would need to check my exact notes.
Kevin: But you remember Omagh anyway?
Officer: Oh I definitely remember Omagh alright. I definitely remember the warning you gave me about Newry [referring to previous intelligence on Real IRA operations Kevin passed to his handlers].
Kevin: Remember I saw [name of alleged Omagh bomber] that night in the [name of a bar] in Dundalk and then later on I rang you and asked if you put that in?
Officer: I do remember something along those lines, but I would need to check my notes for the exact dates and times. I would need to check exactly what time you phoned.
Kevin: When will you be able to check?
Officer: I will be able to check this afternoon.
Kevin: Do you want me to ring you later on?
They make small talk again briefly.
Officer: Give me until three o'clock because I will need to compile all the files.
Kevin: I need to be sure you put it in and I'm confident that you did.
Officer: Och, I'm sure I did.
Kevin: Well thanks then.
Officer: Well cheers, man. Speak to you later
Friday-Sunday, 7-9 December, 2001
Horror over refugees entombed in freight containe
The deaths of eight refugees, including three children and a teenager, in a sealed steel container discovered at a Wexford business park has shocked Ireland in the run up to Christmas.
The victims are believed to have booked their tickets on the voyage of death with a deposit of between #5,000 and #10,000. They thought they were being shipped to Britain and died when the longer journey to Ireland was extended due to delays caused by bad weather.
Doctors onfirmed that five other refugees are expected to recover from the horrific five-day ordeal. The five, three men, a 17-year old boy and a woman, were said to be "critically ill but improving".
Derek Coleman, the driver of the furniture consignment who discovered the bodies, was said to be in deep shock and "very traumatised" by the whole event.
British construction contractor Brian Reynolds, also present when the frieght container was opened, said he was deeply shaken by the horrific discovery.
"All we saw when we opened the container was blankets and there was some movement underneath them," Mr Reynolds said. "The first thing that hit me was the awful and overpowering stench in the container.
"We partially closed the doors because we didn't know what was inside and we immediately alerted the site foreman who got the Garda [police]," he said.
Six of the eight dead are understood to be Turks. The group comprised of 11 Turkish nationals from two families together with two adult males from Algeria and Albania. Soem family members of the dead have already arrived from England.
It is believed that the 13 refugees were smuggled into the P&O shipping container when it was parked for six hours on the outskirts of Brussels in Belgium. Forensic tests have indicated that the group were in the container for at least five days including a gruelling sea journey here in Force 10 gales.
Three remain in intensive care in Wexford with one woman in a coronary unit and the 17-year-old boy now transferred to a general hospital ward.
"They are all still very ill but they have improved since yesterday," Dr McKiernan added. "But they are not out of woods yet though all are conscious."
The survivors are being treated for hypothermia and dehydration though kidney and pulmonary problems detected are also typical of low oxygen conditions.
Three of the dead include children and a fourth is a 15-year-old boy. The dead children include a 10-year-old girl, thought to be the sister of the dead teenage boy, as well as a 10-year-old boy and a four-year-old girl.
Sinn Fein TD Caoimhghin O Caolain has described the death of the refugees as an "international scandal" and has called for action from the Irish government and the EU.
He said theI Irish people had been "appalled" by the tragedy.
"I extend deepest sympathy to the relatives of those who died and to those who are seriously ill. This was a tragedy waiting to happen. It was only a matter of time before the type of fatalities, which have occurred en route to other EU countries, happened here also.
It is thought the Turkish mafia was behind the people trafficking operation. The gang mistakenly thought it was bound for a short roll-on, roll-off journey from Belgium to Britain. It was, in fact, bound for a longer journey to this country.
That, and a second mistake coupled with shipping delays due to horrific weather conditions, spelled disaster for the immigrants trapped inside.
And a container transfer mix-up here meant that the steel tomb containing the dying refugees was opened 24 hours later than planned.
Mr O Caolain said those responsible for placing people in such horrendous conditions should be dealt with severely.
"This tragedy also challenges the asylum system and the immigration system in this State and throughout the EU. Economic migrants in particular are the victims of a 'Fortress Europe' policy by which people from poorer states outside the EU find it almost impossible to enter the labour market here. In this State they are accorded no permission to work in their own right but can only gain entry on request from an employer.
"The Irish government and the EU need to re-examine and reform their policy with regard to labour from outside the EU. Otherwise the walls of 'Fortress Europe', like the Berlin Wall in the past, will continue to claim victims."
Mr Peter O'Mahony, from the Irish Refugee Council, said people would "continue to allow themselves to be smuggled or will fall into the hands of traffickers if Europe continues to be as impenetrable to many as it is".
And a "national examination of conscience" in light of the weekend tragedy in Wexford was called for yesterday by the Catholic Bishop of Ferns, Dr Brendan Comiskey.
Irish people had been welcomed in the US, Canada, Australia and elsewhere, he said.
"It doesn't seemed to have dawned on us that we are now the innkeepers of Europe, slamming the doors far more effectively than they were slammed in our faces." The bishop said the "trickle" of asylum-seekers into Rosslare Harbour had "dried up" as a result of government steps to prevent people boarding the ferries from France.
"We have members of the Garda Siochana going to Cherbourg [France] two or three times a week. We need to be told what's going on there and what kind of procedures are being put in place. Laws won't solve the problems of injustice, and I think the Irish people have bigger hearts than that."
Friday-Sunday, 7-9 December, 2001
Feature: The Colombia 3 -- how you can help
By Caitriona Ruane, Chairperson, Bring Them Home
Niall Connolly, Martin McCauley and Jim Monaghan were arrested on 11 August in Bogota Airport by the Colombian Armed Forces. They had spent five weeks in the zone conceded to the FARC in negociations with the Colombian Government. This zone is the size of Switzerland.
They were first imprisoned in El Modelo, a notorious prison in Colombia for human rights abuses and deaths inside. This prison is controlled by right-wing paramilitaries who collude with the Colombian armed forces and have been responsible for some of the worst atrocities - massacres of peasants, trade union leaders, defence lawyers, etc.
It was so dangerous for the three Irishmen in El Modelo that all their food had to be brought in from outside in case it was poisoned. Following pressure from the lawyers, international human rights bodies, the families and the Irish government, the Colombian State moved the men to El Dijin, a police holding centre in Central Bogota. That is where I visited the men.
The international media ran with reports from the world's intelligence agencies, which ranged from the ridiculous to the sublime. They accused them of being narco traffickers, arms smugglers, napalm bomb makers and whatever else they could think of. The Colombian Army said they had video evidence of them doing all these things. After a week or so all this alleged evidence disappeared into thin air and of course there was no video.
There are two forensic tests, one taken by the Colombian authorities, which tests negative for explosives. The other test was taken by the US Embassy in Bogota and conflicts with the Colombian test. This was all done in very suspicious circumstances and begs the question why a foreign government carried out a forensic test in Colombia.
Peace process
There is a peace process in Colombia, which is supported by the majority of the Colombian people, as is the case with the peace process here in Ireland. The peace process in Colombia is at a critical stage and a few weeks after these men were arrested, the continuation of the zone was up for discussion. The Army and police do not want the FARC zone to continue and they are against the peace process. Civil society and human rights groups are very aware that if the zone does not continue and the negotiations end it will intensify the civil war in Colombia. These groups want to see a continuation of the peace process. The three Irishmen are caught up in this situation. They are political hostages between forces in Colombia who want to try and prove that they were training the FARC. They have gone to great lengths to do this. They have fabricated evidence, hired false witnesses and to date the men have been held without formal charges in Colombia.
Prison conditions
The men have been moved four times since they were arrested. The campaign has said that there is no safe place for them in Colombia, given that they have already been tried by media. They are currently being held in El Dijin, after a pistol was found in a cell near them in the previous jail they were in. They are locked up 23 hours per day, isolated from each other, their cells are six feet by three feet and most of that space is taken up with the bed. They are not been given proper access to their lawyers and their defence is being blocked at every turn. Obstacles are being created for their families and campaign workers to visit them. The Colombian government has brought in a new requirement that all Irish people need a visa to enter Colombia. The family are planning to visit prior to Christmas. The tickets are bought and a visa has been requested and we still do not know if they will get to go. Niall Connolly's mother Madeleine is going on this trip and is 76 years of age. This is no way to treat a family who are already suffering because their loved ones are incarcerated in such a manner.
Physical danger
The men's lives are in danger every minute they are being held in Colombia. Their lawyers in Colombia have advised that there is no safe place for them. The Colombian government knows that, the Irish government knows it and so do the international human rights agencies. The families and campaign have informed the Irish government that it is essential that they intervene and call for the Colombian government to send them home. To date, the Irish government has worked very hard on consular matters but it has not publicly called for them to be brought home. It is essential that they protect and speak up for their citizens in the same way as Tony Blair has publicly called for the English people arrested in Greece to be released.
The campaign in Ireland
The men are aware of the campaign here in Ireland. I speak to one of them every two days and fill them in on every activity that is happening or organised. Their families are in regular contact with them and they are filling them in on everything. Every week there have been functions in different parts of Ireland. We had a major concert in Dublin with Christy Moore, Donal Lunny, Sharon Shannon, Philip King, and more than 1,400 people attended. Ex-prisoners have been very active in the campaign and we would like to particularly thank former republican prisoners' organisation Coiste na nIarchimi and its affiliate groups all over Ireland. The support and all the events are what is keeping the family going through very difficult times. We also have a Christmas card that is being sent to the men.
International support
The campaign is receiving international support and has been in contact with groups in Australia, the US, Europe and Latin America. The campaign is also working with international human rights organisations throughout the world.
How to help the Colombia 3:
Friday-Sunday, 7-9 December, 2001
Omagh demands public inquiry
Analysis, Dublin, Ireland, 9 December, 2001
The revelation that the RUC Special Branch had prior knowledge of an impending attack in Omagh 11 days before the town was devastated by the Real IRA bomb on August 15, 1998, raises further deep concerns about policing in the North.
The response of the chief constable, Ronnie Flanagan, a former senior officer in the Special Branch, to the, as yet unpublished, and sensational report on the affair by the police ombudsman, Nuala O'Loan is also discomfiting.
Her report indicates that the Special Branch failed to inform senior officers that it had received concrete information about a planned attack on Omagh before the bomb killed 29 people and injured more than 200. The information, which came anonymously to the RUC in Omagh on August 4 1998, specified that weapons were being smuggled over the border in preparation for an attack on August 15. The RUC officer passed on the information to Special Branch, but no effective action was taken to protect the people of Omagh, with tragic consequences.
O'Loan's report also identified serious flaws in the investigation, including a failure to deploy adequate resources, the use of inexperienced staff and confusion at leadership level within the police.
It is not the first time that allegations have surfaced of mishandling by the RUC in the days leading up to Omagh. Some months ago a police informer, Kevin Fulton, claimed that he had told his Special Branch handler just two days before the Omagh bomb that a major attack was imminent.
He also claims to have identified a key person involved in the bombing and the location where the device was assembled to a leading police officer. His claims raise further disturbing and unresolved questions about the role of the police, and particularly Special Branch, in the affair.
There have been numerous allegations of collusion by the RUC Special Branch with loyalist paramilitaries responsible for the deaths of many innocent nationalists including solicitors Pat Finucane and Rosemary Nelson, and more recently of journalist Martin O'Hagan. But the latest disclosures will add weight to the argument of those who urge caution before endorsing the new Police Service of Northern Ireland.
The Omagh bomb came just months after referenda north and south endorsed the Good Friday Agreement, which provided some basis, however tenuous and contradictory, for a long-term settlement of the Anglo Irish conflict.
There is a lingering suspicion that agents of the state may have deliberately connived to allow armed attacks by loyalists or dissident republicans to destroy the prospects for the successful implementation of the Agreement.
The role of Special Branch and British intelligence agencies of various types in the dirty war in the North has never been fully revealed and indeed has been the subject of cover-ups and public immunity orders by successive British governments.
It is impossible for nationalists in the North, or indeed anyone on the island, to have full public confidence in the new policing arrangements until these outstanding fears are addressed fully by a public inquiry.
Live now, pay later, will rebound
The sight of happy government backbenchers queuing up to praise last week's budget was a relief to the Taoiseach and the Minister for Finance after the tax harmonisation debacle a couple of years ago. Little was left to chance in the last budget before election day. But the effusions of obscure TDs, obsessed with maintaining their current status, should lead the rest of us to treat the minister's strategy with the healthiest scepticism.
Charlie McCreevy's fifth budget represents a significant departure on the part of a man who had made a strong bid for ownership of the prudence franchise. The minister will need events to run strongly in his favour if he is to maintain the effective management of the public finances, while also facilitating the achievement of political objectives next year.
Economic growth estimates range from a low of 1.5 per cent to a high of 7 per cent. The minister expects that GDP growth will slow to 3.9 per cent, with the prospect that medium term growth will reach 5 per cent.
Tough choices have been deferred until after the election. The Department of Finance's figures show that the public finances will deteriorate by 3 per cent of GDP next year and by 5 per cent of GDP a year later.
Last December the department was anticipating that the budget surplus would be 4.6 per cent of GDP in 2003. This figure has been revised back to a deficit of 0.5 per cent.
It is accepted by the government that the rate of growth in the economy is slowing to more modest levels. But the minister is unwilling publicly to accept that there will be difficulties ahead if public spending increases are twice the rate of growth. This is deeply disquieting, given concerns about possible tax hikes.
Where are the provisions in the budget for pay rises to public servants under the benchmarking process? One could argue that the inflexibility of public sector pay arrangements should be addressed, especially when the economy is slowing. But the government entered into commitments with the social partners.
Business will welcome the cutting of the top rate of employer PRSI, even if this is less than the reduction sought. The minister decided to make firms pay next year's taxes this year. By doing this he may have sown the seeds of future woes for vibrant and entrepreneurial small and medium sized firms. As the level of economic activity slows, cashflow pressures diminish for such businesses as working capital requirements fall. But small and medium sized firms may find that they are severely strapped for cash if the economy rebounds.
Tax reliefs for private investors should boost housing supply and help slow the rate at which rents are rising. But this may be of little consolation to first-time buyers who find themselves competing for properties with affluent investors.
Meanwhile the St Augustine School of Economics ("Make me virtuous...but not yet") has little to commend it. The next Minister for Finance will not have the luxury of putting off tough decisions.
Copyright © 2001 Sunday Business Post, Ireland
Friday-Sunday, 7-9 December, 2001
Omagh tip-off report 'hidden' for a year
Northern Ireland: Observer special
Henry McDonald, Ireland Editor Sunday December 9, 2001 The Observer
A senior police officer is to be accused of locking away a Royal Ulster Constabulary report which aired allegations that the police received prior warning of the Omagh bomb outrage. The RUC's internal review of the blast investigation highlighted a telephone warning, 11 days before the August 1998 atrocity, alerting them to a potential terrorist attack in the Co Tyrone town. In a report to be published on Wednesday - and shown to the families of the 29 men, women and children killed in the Real IRA bombing - the Northern Ireland Police Ombudsman's Office will report that top RUC officers sat on 'The Omagh Review ' , completed in November 2000.
The ombudsman, Nuala O'Loan, will report that the review - initiated by Chief Constable Sir Ronnie Flanagan in March 2000 - will claim that a senior officer locked it in a safe and failed to disclose its contents. But it is known that the officer - named more than a dozen times in O'Loan's 15-page report - is now considering legal action against her office.
A spokesman for the Police Service of Northern Ireland said 'The Omagh Review' was never meant for public consumption, and that it was an internal document containing details which 'would not be appropriate to make public'. This included 'a lot of information about people who were interviewed, suspects, informants and so on'. He added: 'Very, very few people would have seen The Omagh Review and there were genuine reasons why it could not be made public.'
A large part of the ombudsman's findings are understood to have been drawn from the review, including the claim about the informer's tip-off. But the Chief Constable has described the critical report of police conduct over Omagh as containing 'factual inaccuracies, unwarranted assumptions and material omissions'.
Flanagan and O'Loan are daggers-drawn over claims and counter-claims about the handling of the Omagh investigation. But she may find it hard to enlist support from the British Government in a public row with him. One source told The Observer last night that her office had been warned 'Ronnie is owed by Downing Street ... he has a long credit line with government'.
Dr John Reid, the Northern Ireland Secretary, has joined unionist politicians in backing Flanagan.
Reid said the leaked extracts were part of 'an unfinished report' where 'the facts aren't agreed, let alone the judgements.'
But Sinn Fein has already accused the Government of taking a partisan view by giving public support to the Chief Constable's version of events.
Flanagan claimed the 4 August phone call did not warn about a bomb attack, and may have been designed to frame criminals with only tentative links to republican terrorism.
The Northern Ireland Police Ombudsman's Office insisted that it was not behind last Thursday's leak of edited parts of its report. And a police service spokesman also denied involvement in any disclosure of O'Loan's findings.
The ombudsman's office has been subjected to harsh criticism from senior police commanders and the Police Federation in Northern Ireland, which represents rank-and-file police officers.
Several PSNI officers are already planning legal action against O'Loan over the arrest of a number of policemen in Co Down during last summer.
Copyright © 2001 Observer
Friday-Sunday, 7-9 December, 2001
Secrecy subverts state of security
By Tom McGurk Dublin, Ireland, 9 December, 2001
Make no mistake about it, the coming fall-out of police Ombudsman Nuala O'Loan's investigation into the RUC handling of the Omagh bomb investigation represents the most critical moment yet in the controversial 30-year-long history of the relationship between democratic/political control and policing in NI.
And in all of the crossfire that can be expected in the days to come, the most important factor to remember in all of this is that for the first time a totally independent light is being shone into the darkness. For the first time ever, a public figure of unapproachable integrity has gained access to security material in a way that has never happened before.
The deepening suspicion for years now has been that the security services in the North have been beyond any political control and have conducted a secret war in their own way and for their own political purposes.
The links in this chain have continually surfaced above the water and despite the determined efforts of various agencies, including the media, their cover has never been breached. And the links go right back to the beginning of the troubles: the Dublin bombings that brought in the Offences Against the State Act in 1972, the Dublin/Monaghan bombings, the Murder Triangle, the Stalker Affair, the Brian Nelson Affair, the Finucane and Nelson murders, the Billy Wright saga and down the years the continuous emerging linkage in so many killings between the intelligence services and loyalist paramilitaries. And these are only part of a long list.
At the heart of this linkage has been the RUC Special Branch which now finds itself in the spotlight over the new Omagh investigation. And it could hardly come at a worse time and in a worse way. At stake is the credibility of the new NI Police Service, the new political relationship between Dublin and London and the relationship between the PSNI and the Garda, not to mention the extraordinary hurt that has been caused to the relatives and survivors of the Omagh massacre.
Indeed, there's the SDLP on the new Police Board in the middle of it all. For all of bluster of Ken Maginnis and the fury of the Police Federation of Northern Ireland, this is not a situation where (as with John Stalker and later with Peter Mandelson and the Patten Report) the opening door can be slammed shut again.
In Nuala O'Loan, those who are determined to keep the past locked up are facing a challenge unlike any they have faced before. O'Loan's chief investigator on the Omagh investigation is Commander David Woods, on secondment from Scotland Yard where he has already got a reputation as a police sleaze buster.
On his team are over 40 experienced operators from places as far afield as South Africa, Hong Kong, New South Wales and other British police forces. Place this level of expertise beside the growing and understandable level of public outrage about the turn the Omagh investigation has taken and at last we have a scenario where finally a key can be turned on the secret war.
Add all of this to the fact that the credibility of the new police service in the North is now hanging by a thread again and it is clearly in everyone's political interests that London deal resolutely with the emerging crisis. While the penetration of paramilitaries with agents and informers is clearly an acceptable and probably unavoidable method of policing even in a democratic society, the question that then arises concerns the control and the agenda to which these people are being run.
This is at the heart of the question that now looms out of the Omagh catastrophe. Were all those lives lost at Omagh or at least risked in order to protect the cover of an agent within the Republican paramilitaries who carried out the bombing?
And there is another even more disturbing question; was somewhere a calculation made that carnage in Omagh would once and for all end even the most marginal support for paramilitarism?
Would such an act then provoke the authorities into such a level of Draconian legislation that the security services would finally have the sort of security legislation that they had always complained of not having in the first place?
That both of these eventualities then actually came about does little to placate the growing public unease. Nor could there be a better case now for a proper public inquiry into this whole saga, both to restore public confidence and to test these suspicions, however conspiratorial or bizarre they might be.
The long history of the political unaccountability of the security services within the British state only adds fuel to this controversy. For those who have read the book Spy Catcher by Peter Wright, which outlined among other things the targeting of former British Prime Minister Harold Wilson by his own security agencies when he was in 10 Downing Street in the 1970s, this week's revelations will come as no surprise.
Subsequently in the 1980s, Colin Wallace's claims and the still unsolved murder of nuclear campaigner Hilda Morel only added more smoke to the fire.
Obliquely poised as Britain is between constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy, the loyalty of the British state's security services has always been to Crown rather than Commons. They simply enjoy a unique power-base protected behind myriad secrecy laws and a long tradition of being both above and beyond political scrutiny.
Security policy in the North has always finally rested with them and what is now lapping around the Omagh tragedy is but an undercurrent of far larger, deeper and very ancient waters.
Make no mistake about it, Nuala O'Loan and the independence of her office will now be in the firing line. Her simple act of civic responsibility and the meaningful exercise of her democratically mandated function as the public's watchdog has dealt a grave blow to those who have always wanted to have it otherwise.
Indeed there could be hardly a finer compliment to her integrity than Ken Maginnis's description of her on BBC as "a suicide bomber". Ken has recently donned ermine in the Lords, but not for the first time it becomes grimly apparent that you can't buy political class. Given the circumstances, too, of the dead and maimed of Omagh, that sick remark gives us an extraordinary insight into the truly rarefied moral high ground where only Ken still thinks he dwells.
Copyright © 2001 Sunday Business Post, Ireland
O'Loan toughens Omagh report
Ombudsman answers police denials with extra details
Rosie Cowan, Ireland correspondent Monday December 10, 2001
The Northern Ireland police ombudsman's shattering report on the force's handling of the Omagh bomb inquiry is likely to be even tougher than previously suggested, it emerged yesterday. Amid the continuing uproar about the revelation that the special branch failed to tell the local police about two advance warnings, and that the murder investigation itself was littered with mistakes, Nuala O'Loan is working around the clock to ensure that her 150-page report is as robust as possible.
She cut short a business trip to New York to return to her Belfast office at the weekend to give her team of experienced investigators her full backing.
Sir Ronnie Flanagan, the chief constable, who received a confidential copy 12 days ago, has made a furious rebuttal, castigating it as factually inaccurate, and full of assumptions, misunderstandings and omissions.
John Reid, the secretary of state, has also gone on the offensive. He has reiterated his confidence in the chief constable and insisted that there was no prior warning of a bomb in Omagh.
There are unlikely to be any significant material changes to the content of the report before it is published on Wednesday. But rather than bow to considerable pressure to dilute it, Mrs O'Loan is likely to harden its language and add even more details.
The report does not say there was a specific bomb warning for Omagh, but that 11 days before the explosion an anonymous caller told the police that four named people were planning a gun and mortar attack on security forces in the town on August 15 1998, the day 29 people died in the Real IRA blast.
It also describes a warning less than three days before the outrage by the double agent known as Kevin Fulton, who identified a man he said was making a large device for a destination in Northern Ireland.
Even though the special branch rated Fulton's tip-offs as top grade at the time of the bomb, intelligence officers did not pass on any of this information, either to the local police before the atrocity or to the murder squad afterwards, nor were any of the five people named ever questioned in connection with Omagh.
Mrs O'Loan remains convinced that the warnings were passed to the special branch by the officers who received them, in accordance with police procedure. But her investigators did not recover all the branch records pertaining to Fulton.
Her team uncovered an internal police review, completed last year, which pointed to hundreds of errors in the murder inquiry, including the loss of the bomb car for almost two years. The review was kept secret and its 250 recommendations were largely ignored.
Mrs O'Loan has rejected the chief constable's plea for more time to respond to the report, because he failed to describe the nature of the "inaccuracies" he wished to refute
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2001
Flash: Double agent William Stobie shot dead
Former RUC double agent William Stobie has been killed this morning.
Mr Stobie, who was involved in the UDA murder of Belfast human rights lawyer Pat Finucane, was shot dead in north Belfast this morning. He had been at the centre of allegations that British forces had colluded in the murder.
Stobie went on trial in Belfast last month accused of murdering Mr Finucane in February 1989 through aiding and abetting.
The former loyalist had always insisted he told his police handlers in advance that the UDA planned to carry out a shooting. But the case sensationally collapsed when the prosecution's only witness was not called on medical grounds. Stobie immediately called for an inquiry into how the investigation of Mr Finucane's killing had been handled.
The double-agent was gunned down by five shots fired at close range outside his flat in Forthriver Road. His murder was claimed by the Red Hand Defenders (a cover name for the UDA), but it is suspected that other forces may have been involved.
His partner, who was at home at the time of the shooting, was said to be hysterical and in deep shock.
In a statement today, the family of Mr Finucane expressed shock at Mr Stobie's killing.
They said: "The family did not want him murdered nor did they even want him prosecuted. All they wanted was the truth.
"There have been too many murders and too many grieving relatives.
"If a public inquiry had been established into Pat's murder instead of the Stevens police investigation, Billy Stobie could have been granted anonymity and his identity unknown and he would probably still be alive today."
Sinn Fein Assembly member for North Belfast Gerry Kelly commenting on the killing, said people should not jump to conclusions that this was simply a loyalist attack.
"It is another sad and tragic twist to an unravelling story of collusion.
"While a loyalist may have been the person who pulled the trigger it is clear that those who had most to gain from the death of William Stobie were his RUC Special Branch handlers.
"Many people will be convinced that this killing smells of the RUC Special Branch and British Military Intelligence getting rid of an embarrassment and potential problems down the road.
"These suspicions will be compounded by the timing of the shooting, on the day that the spotlight is firmly on the Special Branch and their role in the Omagh bombing
Collusion suspected in Stobie Murder
For many the hand of the British secret services is plain to be seen in the summary execution in Belfast on Wednesday of former RUC Special Branch agent and UDA quartermaster William Stobie. Stobie's death removes one of the most crucial witnesses who would have given evidence to a public inquiry about the links between British state forces and the murder of defence lawyer Pat Finucane.
Stobie supplied and later disposed of the weapons used by the killers of Finucane in 1989. He was recently brought to trial for his part in that murder and the sectarian killing of Adam Lambert.
The trial collapsed after the Director of Public Prosecutions ruled that the chief prosecution witness could not be called to give evidence. A former journalist and government press officer Neil Mulholland signed himself into a psychiatric unit almost two years ago.
Stobie claimed he informed his RUC handlers on two separate occasions of a pending attack by a well-known loyalist gang. Despite the fact that a simple roadblock could have intercepted the gang, the Special Branch later claimed they were unable to thwart the killing because Stobie had not named the intended target. It is believed that Stobie admitted to Mulholland that he knew Finucane was the intended target.
After lengthy interrogation by RUC Special Branch, Stobie contacted another journalist, Ed Moloney, and changed his story. In a detailed account Stobie told Moloney he did not know Finucane was the target. It provided a convenient, if not wholly convincing, escape clause for his RUC handlers.
Stobie was shot at around 6.15am outside a block of flats in the loyalist Forthriver Road. He died at the scene. The killing has been claimed by the Red Hand Defenders, a cover name for the UDA.
Sinn Fein's Gerry Kelly described it as another twist in "an unravelling story of collusion which smells of the RUC Special Branch and British military intelligence getting rid of an embarrassment and potential problem".
Brian Nelson, the British agent who was chief of UDA intelligence at the time of the Finucane murder and other controversial killings, now appears to hold the key to unlocking the truth of British/Loyalist collusion in the North of Ireland.
The Dublin government said the shooting "may have been an attempt to stifle the search for the truth". Civil liberties groups reiterated demands for a public inquiry, with British-Irish Rights Watch saying this should be done "before anyone else associated with this case is murdered".
The London-based group called on the British Secretary of State to initiate an independent public inquiry into the Finucane killing and Stobie's death. Following comments made by loyalist spokesperson John White, Jane Winter of BIRW asked if Stobie had been killed "to defend the honour of the RUC."
John White, a UDA representative, admitted that Stobie's public call for an inquiry into his prosecution and the ramifications of the Finucane murder had "angered many people in the loyalist community" and that White claimed the Finucane case was being used to undermine the RUC and the Six County state.
"Is the implication that Stobie was murdered by loyalist paramilitaries intent on defending the honour of the RUC?", Winter asked.
The human rights spokesperson went on to point out that White did not reveal in the interview, or in other interviews, that he had accompanied loyalist Johnny Adair in a visit to Stobie at which he was allegedly assured that his life was not in danger. "The alleged assurance clearly had a sell-by date," said Winters.
Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams MP and Martin McGuinness MP are to discuss the Stobie killing this [Thursday] afternoon in Downing Street.
Speaking on the eve of the meeting, Mr. Adams said the Sinn Féin focus would be on "British dirty tricks, policing, the revelations of recent days and the continuing refusal of Mr. Blair to face up to the British government’s responsibility in relation to the Brian Nelson affair."
Police Ombudsman's report on Omagh bomb
The following is the summarised report of the Police Ombudsman following her investigation into events surrounding the 1998 Omagh bomb which was released this afternoon.
Statement by the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland on her Investigation of matters relating to the Omagh Bomb on August 15, 1998
On Saturday 15 August 1998 a terrorist bomb exploded in Omagh killing 29 people and two unborn children. It was the worst single terrorist incident since the start of "The Troubles" in 1969.
The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) immediately established an Omagh Bomb Investigation Team. The Chief Constable Sir Ronnie Flanagan gave a strong commitment to see that "no stone would be left unturned until we bring these people to justice".
No criminal charges have been brought by the RUC/Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) against anyone in relation to the bombing of Omagh.
The persons responsible for the Omagh bombing are the terrorists who planned and executed the atrocity. Nothing contained in this report should detract from that clear and unequivocal fact.
THE POLICE OMBUDSMAN INVESTIGATION: BACKGROUND AND REMIT
The Chief Constable was notified in writing of the Police Ombudsman's investigation on 14 August 2001.The investigation was undertaken following increasing press speculation that the RUC had prior knowledge relating to the bombing of Omagh. It was the view of the Police Ombudsman that continued speculation would only add stress and pain to those who had suffered. On 19 September 2001 the Police Ombudsman extended the scope of its investigation.
The remit of the Police Ombudsman investigation has been to establish:
At 10.00am on 4 August 1998 a Police Officer stationed in Omagh Police Station received an anonymous telephone call, warning of an "unspecified" attack on police in Omagh on 15 August 1998. The information provided included:
The call lasted for at least ten minutes.
The Police Officer persuaded the caller to agree to call back the following evening. No further telephone call was received.
He was, and remains, blameless.
The Officer was convinced by the caller's tone that the call was genuine, and that the caller had a real fear for what was going to happen on 15 August 1998.
The Officer drove from Omagh Sub-Divisional Headquarters to Divisional Headquarters in Enniskillen. He met the Detective Chief Inspector who accompanied him to the offices of Special Branch in Enniskillen and he told the Special Branch officers what he had been told.
The RUC Review of the Omagh Bomb Investigation concluded in November 2000 that the information should have been passed to the Sub-Divisional Commander Omagh.
Special Branch personnel told the Omagh Police Officer that 'C' and 'D' were 'only smugglers'.The Special Branch Officers had apparently not left the room at any stage before making this assessment.
The Special Branch Officers made arrangements to be present the next day in the event of a further telephone call, in order that they could speak to the caller. No further tele phone call was received.
The Special Branch Officers did not pass the information to the Sub-Divisional Commander Omagh to allow him to consider appropriate action.This failure was in contravention of the RUC Force Order.
The RUC commissioned an internal review of the Omagh Bomb Investigation (the Omagh Bomb Review Report). One of its conclusions was that the Sub-Divisional Commander should have been informed of the information contained in the telephone call.The Review recommended the appointment of an officer of appropriate rank to investigate the full circumstances of the action taken in respect of the information. Following receipt of that report, this recommendation has not been implemented.
The Chief Constable has told Police Ombudsman's Investigators that he is satisfied this information was not relevant to the Omagh Bomb.
Comment
Force Regulations
At the time the anonymous information was received on 4 August 1998, the RUC Force Order stated that the Sub-Divisional Commander, his Deputy or in their absence the Duty Officer should be informed of such threats. The Chief Constable has said it was acceptable that Special Branch did not pass on the information received on 4 August 1998. He is wrong.
'Only Smugglers'
At the time the anonymous information was received on 4 August 1998, it was inappropriate to suggest that just because someone was a smuggler, it was unlikely that they would be involved in terrorism. At that time, and since then, it has been established that terrorists often engage in smuggling and smugglers have been known to be involved in terrorism. Knowledge of smuggling is often central to the illegal movement of material across the border.
Continuity IRA
At the time the anonymous information was received on 4 August 1998, the RUC has confirmed to Police Ombudsman's Investigators that whichever organisation claimed responsibility for a Republican dissident incident, they were all to be considered part of the Real IRA. The Police Ombudsman's Office does not therefore accept as significant the recent comments of the Chief Constable that the anonymous intelligence related to the Continuity IRA and not to the Real IRA, which claimed responsibility for the attack.
Anonymous Information
At the time the anonymous information was received on 4 August 1998 the RUC actively encouraged the use of anonymous information. Anonymous information has a considerable part to play in solving crime. Enquiries by the Police Ombudsman's Investigators have established that the RUC made five arrests for murder and two for attempted murder based on anonymous information during the year 2000.
It is accepted that the RUC would have received hundreds (or more) of anonymous telephone calls each year. However, the call was not a typical anonymous call, it was made directly to the police station within the area which was to be attacked. It was not a brief telephone call with limited information. The caller provided considerable information and was engaged in conversation for at least ten minutes. Significantly, the Officer who received the call was convinced that the call was genuine.
Omagh Sub-Divisional Commander
The Sub-Divisional Commander Omagh was never told about the anonymous information. When he was shown the intelligence two years later on the anniversary of the explosion he said he would have set up Vehicle Check Points. When he met the Police Ombudsman's Investigator in September 2001 he said he did not remember seeing the intelligence and said that he would have taken other action and would not have set up Vehicle Check Points.
The recollection of the Sub-Divisional Commander Omagh is not accepted by the Police Ombudsman. The Sub-Divisional Commander Omagh was, by that stage, been involved in the aftermath of the Omagh Bomb explosion for two years. This could have clouded his judgment or memory.
On examination of the Special Branch records, which were available at the time the anonymous call was received, the Police Ombudsman's Investigators discovered strong indications for a possible identity of 'E' who had significant subversive involvement with Republican terrorist activity.While this individual may or may not be 'E', the details established provide sufficient grounds for more detailed enquiries to have been made rather than the immediate rejection which occurred.
During the period 6 June 1998 and 12 August 1998 an RUC informant known as Kevin Fulton had five meetings with his 'handler', a Criminal Investigation Department (CID) Officer.
The Officer kept contact sheets (records) of his meetings with Fulton and passed them to the RUC Force Intelligence Bureau.Any intelligence of a subversive nature must then be passed to Special Branch.
Between 6 and 8 June 1998 Fulton met his handler and gave information regarding (A) who lived in the Republic of Ireland and was involved with the Real IRA. Fulton said that 'A' had been seeking to obtain coffee grinders (sometimes used in the making of bombs). During a meeting on 23 July 1998 Fulton said that at one time 'A' smelt of fertiliser (the suggestion being that he had been making bombs).
During a meeting on 12 August 1998, three days prior to the Omagh Bomb, Fulton said the Real IRA " was about to move something North over the next few days". Fulton also named another person, B, who was assisting 'A'.
Shortly after the Omagh Bomb, Fulton telephoned his handler to ensure that, in particular, the information he supplied on 12 August 1998 had been recorded.
A letter sent on behalf of the Chief Constable to the Sunday People newspaper was factually wrong. It concluded that Fulton's information was 'retrospective' and 'found to be without any foundation whatsoever". It was not retrospective and has been found to have substance.
The information was passed by the CID handler to the Force Intelligence Bureau. The Force Intelligence Bureau passed this information to Special Branch.
The CID handler, additionally, verbally briefed Special Branch about this information but no records exist of this verbal exchange. A Special Branch officer remembers he received calls but cannot provide any details.
Special Branch states that they have never received these HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT DOCUMENTS.
The Police Ombudsman's Office is satisfied that the intelligence was given to Special Branch. The fact that Special Branch states that it never received these documents represents, at the very least, a very serious breakdown in communication.
A consideration of the intelligence may have resulted in the following action:
Kevin Fulton's relationship with the RUC
Kevin Fulton was an informant to RUC Special Branch between 1992 and 1994. Special Branch officers confirm that Fulton had supplied intelligence that "had resulted in one or two successful operations" but say that he became a "maverick who could not distinguish between truth and fiction". Kevin Fulton accepts that he supplied misleading information at this time. The Police Ombudsman's Investigators are aware of his reasons for giving this misleading information, these issues are being considered by a government agency. He was de-registered as an informant in 1994. In June 1996 Kevin Fulton was re-registered as a source to the RUC and became a CID informant.
In July 1997 Kevin Fulton's CID handler's superior officer was told by Special Branch that Fulton was "an intelligence nuisance". Nevertheless the CID handler was told by his management to continue to use Fulton as an informant. He continued to provide high-grade criminal intelligence.
Between June 1998 and August 1998 Kevin Fulton was graded as an 'A1' by CID. 'A1' infers that the source is "reliable" and the information "accurate". During this time Special Branch gave Fulton's information a grading of 'B2', which inferred the source is "usually reliable" and the information is "believed accurate".
In July 1997 Kevin Fulton was granted "participating informant" status by the Assistant Chief Constable Crime.This means that he was authorised by that senior officer to take part in a crime in order to enable the police to prevent a serious crime, or if it did take place, to arrest the principal offenders.
Throughout his involvement with the RUC, Fulton received substantial financial rewards from the RUC and from other organisations.
The Police Ombudsman was informed by senior Special Branch Officers that on one occasion Fulton provided information which led to the prevention of a very serious attack and "he undoubtedly saved lives".
On 10 May 2000 Fulton was declared "dangerous" as a CID source, and he was documented as being "unreliable" after articles appeared in newspaper referring to an "RUC Mole" and it was thought by Special Branch that Fulton had inspired them.
On 21 August 2001 Kevin Fulton was described by the Head of Special Branch to the Police Ombudsman's Office as "an intelligence nuisance".
On 11 September 2001 the Chief Constable described Fulton as a "Walter Mitty type".
It is considered unlikely by the Office of the Police Ombudsman that the information provided by Kevin Fulton alone could have prevented the Omagh Bomb.The information itself was not specific enough to have generated action in any particular town.
There has been no full investigation of the possible role played by the persons referred to in the anonymous information or the persons referred to by Kevin Fulton and therefore it is not possible to conclude if a response to this information may have made a difference.
ACC Crime commissioned a review of the RUC investigation into the Omagh Bomb, this commenced on 24 March 2000 and was finalised on 17 November 2000. It was the first formal murder review conducted by the RUC. The Reviewing Officer led an experienced team of eleven officers and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary endorsed the process and mechanisms used for undertaking the review.
The Review Officer made a total of 274 recommendations, including 134 recommendations relating to evidential opportunities. It records some areas of good practice but also raised areas of concern.
Many evidential opportunities had been missed.
Role of Special Branch in Relation to Omagh
Objective assessment of all available intelligence would, however, have produced other details by 17 August 1998 of 'firm' suspects, when maximum forensic opportunities were available.
The individuals identified could then have been subject to prompt and proper investigation.
The evaluation and assessment of intelligence by the RUC, failed to produce the available big ger picture and failed to identify patterns of activity and evidential opportunities for the Omagh Bomb Investigation Team.
It has been necessary to consider the role and structure of RUC Special Branch and the effect its policies have had on the ability of the RUC to carry out the Omagh Bomb investigation.
As Special Branch are not the investigators of crime, they are ill-placed to know the relevance of all material and it must be for the Senior Investigating Officer to decide whether intelligence can assist their investigation.
The specific intelligence documents which relate to 1998 were recovered from only a sample of the intelligence examined, a wider analysis could identify more.
Special Branch and the Chief Constable were reluctant to grant access to their material to Police Ombudsman's Investigators and failed to inform those Investigators of a computer system where intelligence, vital to the investigation, was held.
There was a failure to reveal intelligence, which led to a request on 21 September 2001 for direct access to intelligence systems in order that the Police Ombudsman could have confidence that all relevant material was made available to Police Ombudsman's Investigators.
A hiatus in the investigation then occurred while the Chief Constable then considered this request.The Chief Constable did not agree to this request until 9 October 2001 and access was not achieved until 17 October 2001 when computers were made available for Police Ombudsman's Investigators.
Four weeks had thus passed waiting for access to be made available During the course of this most important investigation, while a number of Police Officers have responded magnificently, it remains the case that some police witnesses have inexplicably varied their accounts to the Police Ombudsman's Investigators.
Others have sought to avoid talking to the Investigators or declined to make statements or have made limited statements and have refused to expand upon them.
There is evidence to show that discussions have taken place which have impacted upon these responses.
These incidents have generally involved officers who have nothing to hide.
RECOMMENDATIONS
If these matters and the Recommendations are dealt with in a very positive way, then the Police Service of Northern Ireland will be healthier, more professional and more effective as a result. What is outlined here will take no little courage and self-examination, but positive consideration of it will be a good investment.The Police Ombudsman's Report presents windows of opportunity, it is not designed to be destructively critical and it is not directed at the foundations and most of the superstructure of the RUC. Leadership failure is identified but the Recommendations are designed to recover, as far as possible, lost ground.
The Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland makes the following Recommendations:
It is the sincere wish of the Police Ombudsman that the Report into the investigation of matters relating to the Omagh Bomb on 15 August 1998 will be fully considered and that a positive way forward will be found which will facilitate the thorough and effective investigation of the Omagh Bomb. It is in the interests of everyone that those responsible for this terrible atrocity are brought to justice.
Amnesty International and Committee on the Administration of Justice on murder of William Stobie
Press release from Amnesty International
AI Index: EUR 45/026/2000 Publish date: 12/12/2001
Amnesty International was seriously disturbed by the news that William Stobie was murdered this morning in North Belfast by armed gunmen. The Red Hand Defenders have claimed responsibility for the shooting.
"William Stobie's murder reinforces the need for the government to initiate immediately a full, independent and public inquiry into allegations of official collusion into the murder of Patrick Finucane," Amnesty International said. Patrick Finucane was a human rights lawyer, who was shot dead by the Ulster Defence Association (UDA, a Loyalist paramilitary group) in February 1989.
Charges against William Stobie -- of aiding and abetting in the murder of Patrick Finucane -- were dropped on 26 November, just two weeks ago. William Stobie had been a quartermaster of the UDA and an agent of Special Branch (police intelligence) during the time that Patrick Finucane was killed. He claimed that prior to the killing of Patrick Finucane, he had warned his Special Branch handlers that someone was about to be killed, and that he had provided enough details to possibly prevent the killing and to arrest people who still possessed the weapons after the killing. He claimed that the police had failed to act on this information. No charges were brought against him until 1999 when Sir John Stevens was requested by the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary to return to Northern Ireland and investigate allegations of collusion in the murder of Patrick Finucane.
William Stobie was a key witness concerning allegations of official police collusion in the murder of Patrick Finucane. His claims that Special Branch may have been able to prevent the killing and of their failure to arrest the perpetrators, have never been tested in court. The involvement of Special Branch in allegedly obstructing the investigation into the killing of Patrick Finucane was raised again recently by an RUC officer, who claimed that one of the people who had shot Patrick Finucane had confessed on tape in 1991, in the presence of a Special Branch officer. He claimed that Special Branch blocked further investigation of the confession or any prosecution. It was alleged that the Special Branch officer was also William Stobie's handler.
"Given the allegations of Special Branch involvement in the killing of Patrick Finucane, the government should initiate a thorough, genuinely independent and impartial investigation into the killing of William Stobie," Amnesty International said
Copyright 2001 © Amnesty International
Creating a shadow criminal justice system in the name of "fighting international terrorism"
Press release from Amnesty International
In the wake of the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States, the UK government issued an Order, proposing the UK's derogation from Article 5(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). The government has declared that there is a "public emergency" in the UK in justifying its suspension of individuals' right to liberty, as guaranteed by the ECHR. Whether there is a public emergency in the UK threatening the life of the nation is an open question. When the Secretary of State announced the proposal for the legislation in October, he said that "(t)here is no immediate intelligence pointing to a specific threat to the United Kingdom...". Amnesty International is not aware of any other European government contemplating derogation from international human rights treaty obligations.
On 13 November the government published the "Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill". The Bill had its second reading in the House of Commons on 19 November and it is expected to be passed as an Act in the week of 10 December. Amnesty International (AI) is concerned:
GOALS OF ACTION
To express concerns regarding the proposed derogation from Article 5 of the ECHR - To oppose proposals regarding indefinite detention without charge and trial - To call for consideration of all asylum applications on their merits in a fair procedure
LIST OF ATTACHED DOCUMENTS
United Kingdom - Creating a shadow criminal justice system in the name of "fighting international terrorism", AI Index: EUR 45/019/2001, November 2001
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS
LETTER/FAX/EMAIL-WRITING
IMPORTANT: LETTERS MUST BE SENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND ANYWAY WITHIN THE FIRST WEEK OF DECEMBER, GIVEN THE SPEED WITH WHICH THE BILL IS EXPECTED TO BE PASSED
Please write courteously-worded letters to the authorities listed below. After identifying yourself as an AI member/group, raise the following concerns:
AI is concerned about the extraordinarily short time made available for parliamentary and public scrutiny of the Bill.
AI is concerned that some of the measures in the newly proposed Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill, if implemented, may contravene internationally recognized human rights standards -- including the rights to liberty, fair trial and freedom of association -- and facilitate the violation of individuals' human rights. Say that it is the obligation of the government to ensure the protection of human rights of all people in the jurisdiction. In particular, raise the following concerns:
people will be categorized as a "national security risk" and "an international terrorist", on the basis of the Secretary of State's beliefs or suspicions. The criteria for such beliefs or suspicions are not spelt out in the Bill; there must be an expressed requirement that the suspicion be "reasonable". AI is also concerned that the basis for such beliefs or suspicions will be secret information, which the person will be unable to effectively challenge. Everyone should have the right to defend themselves against serious allegations in a court of law, in full and fair proceedings.
the system of indefinite detention proposed in the Bill will establish an informal criminal justice system without the safeguards of the formal system. Anyone deemed to be threats to national security and "suspected international terrorists" could be imprisoned indefinitely on the basis of information inadmissible as evidence in a trial, and on a significantly lower standard of proof that is not set out in the draft legislation. Anyone who is detained should be either promptly charged with recognizable criminal offences and tried within a reasonable period in proceedings that comply fully with international fair trial standards; or deported within a reasonable period to another country where there is no risk of being subjected to the imposition of the death penalty, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or other serious human rights abuses, and to an unfair trial. It is a violation of fundamental human rights for states to detain people who they do not intend to prosecute and who cannot be deported, on grounds of national security.
persons certified to be "international terrorists and national security risks", will be denied an individual assessment on the merits of their application for asylum. A determination to exclude an individual from refugee status should only be made after full consideration of the claim in a fair and satisfactory asylum procedure.
Say that AI is also concerned about the UK's proposed derogation from Article 5(1) of the ECHR in order to permit the indefinite detention without charge or trial of foreign nationals who allegedly pose a threat to national security and whom the government is unable to remove or deport, under Article 3 of the ECHR. Note that AI is not aware of any other European government contemplating derogation from international human rights treaty obligation.
LIST OF ADDRESSES
Prime Minister:
The Rt Hon Tony Blair, MP Prime Minister 10 Downing Street London SW1A 2AA fax no. 0044 20 7925 0918Salutation: Dear Prime Minister
Home Secretary The Rt Hon David Blunkett MP Secretary of State for the Home Department 50 Queen Anne's Gate London SW1H 9AT fax no. 0044 20 7273 3965 email Salutation: Dear Secretary of StateLord Chancellor's Department:
Lord High Chancellor, Rt Hon Lord Irvine of Lairg, QC House of Lords, London SW1A 0PW fax no. 0044 20 7219 4711 email general.queries@lcdhq.gsi.gov.ukSalutation: Dear Lord Chancellor
Please send a copy of your letters to the UK embassy in your country. Please also send copies of your letters and of any replies you receive to the UK team at the International Secretariat.
If you need any further information, do not hesitate to contact the UK team at the International Secretariat: email edepieri@amnesty.org
Copyright 2001 © Amnesty International
Flanagan's folly
Dublin, Ireland, 16 December, 2001
Time is running out for Ronnie Flanagan, chief constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland. The damning report by the Police Ombudsman, Nuala O'Loan, into the flawed RUC investigation of the Omagh bombing makes his position practically untenable.
His outbursts since the limited publication of the report prepared by senior British officer, David Wood, smack of desperation.
To state that he would "publicly commit suicide" if the contents of the O'Loan report were proven accurate was ill advised, particularly as he was forced, only 24 hours later, to admit that mistakes were made during the Omagh investigation. His admission that a range of errors were made by the RUC before and after the Omagh bomb, which killed 29 people and injured hundreds in August 1998, was grudging, but welcome.
This revised position contrasts starkly with his public denials in recent months that any warnings were received before the packed market town was bombed by the Real IRA. On July 30 Flanagan specifically stated that any suggestion of advance warnings were "rubbish" and "without foundation".
O'Loan found that two warnings, by an anonymous caller and by the police agent calling himself Kevin Fulton, were passed on to the RUC Special Branch in the days leading up to the attack. Yet no effective action was taken.
The Police Ombudsman's report cites a litany of errors and inadequacies in the police handling of the subsequent investigation into the attack. Her claim that there was a failure of leadership, poor judgement and a lack of urgency in the police service should, in itself, encourage Flanagan to bring forward his planned retirement. The fact that Flanagan has defended a Special Branch decision not to pass on warnings to the Omagh sub-divisional commander in advance of the attack is further cause for concern.
Flanagan's rise to the top of the RUC has mirrored the accumulation of power by the 800-strong Special Branch. The force has been drawn into several, as yet unresolved, controversies. These include the murder of Belfast solicitor Pat Finucane in February 1989.
The RUC Special Branch was forewarned by police agent William Stobie of an imminent attack on Finucane at his home. Nothing was done to protect the solicitor, and Stobie, whose evidence would have been central to any independent inquiry into the affair, has now been shot dead. The finger of suspicion points to his erstwhile friends in the Ulster Defence Association. Indeed, at least three informers, including British agent, Brian Nelson and a former UDA leader in west Belfast were involved in Finucane's killing.
Until now, the British government has prevented proper disclosure of the extent of collusion between the police, loyalist, and even republican paramilitaries in the course of its dirty war in the North. There is evidence to suggest that clearance for `black operations' came from the highest political level during the 1980s and early 1990s and that they were orchestrated through the intelligence agency, MI5. Attempts at investigations by John Stalker, John Stevens and Colin Sampson -- each of them senior English police officers -- have come to nothing.
Clearly Ronnie Flanagan is not the only obstacle impeding the search for truth in these matters. But his immediate removal from office could only be of assistance.
Competition limits
Close examination by the Competition Authority of professional services providers should be welcomed by their customers and those who complain of limited access to the professions. But before anyone anticipates radical action arising from a probe into restrictive practices, there are grounds for suspecting that the inquiry will come to nothing.
Already the director of the new study focusing on medical practitioners, dentists, vets, optometrists, solicitors, barristers, engineers and architects has conceded that there could be difficulty in enforcing the study's findings. The Competition Authority has sent a detailed questionnaire to representatives of the eight professions, and analysis of the information obtained is expected to start in the new year. Various professional bodies have been quick to assert their claims to openness.
It is in the interests of all consumers of services that there should be a thorough investigation of all factors relating to competition. A number of key industry sectors have been opened up to competition in the recent past. For the most part the results have been extremely positive and a timely end has been brought to anti-competitive practices that impose unnecessary costs on business and aggrandise service providers who create little or no wealth.
At the end of its fact-finding process, the Competition Authority plans to present recommendations and suggest best practice guidelines to the government and to professional bodies. The ultimate objective is the elimination of obstacles and hindrances to competition. All of this sounds fine. But the capacity of the Competition Authority to act is very limited. If a professional body does not like a recommendation that is made, regardless of how progressive it may be, there is little that the authority can do thereafter. Its options appear restricted to exerting moral pressure and highlighting issues.
In recent times old, anti-competitive habits have been shown to die hard. In areas other than the professions the fight for the introduction of greater competition has been extremely tough and costly. Recently a bus company from the west of Ireland found itself embroiled in a legal action with CIE that is estimated to have cost £2 million in fees before an agreement was reached under which it secured licences to operate on a number of extra routes.
Meanwhile, the chairman of the Competition Authority has said that the 1996 pharmacy regulations, which govern access to the pharmacy business, are disproportionate, unnecessary and limit competition. Such views will be expressed in the authority's submission to the review group on pharmacy regulations established by the Minister for Health.
The Competition Authority does not have the power to challenge state-restricted competition. This includes such areas as the pharmacy regulations and the pub licensing laws.
Despite the publicly declared determination of the authority chairman to pursue those who engage in anti-competitive practices, concerns persist that the authority has neither the powers nor the resources to effect real change. This must be remedied and without delay if the latest study on which the authority has embarked is not to become another fruitless exercise.
Copyright © 2001 Sunday Business Post, Ireland
Flanagan apologises for 'suicide' outburst'
Henry McDonald, Ireland editor, The Observer
Sir Ronnie Flanagan last night mounted a robust attack on an inquiry into the handling of the Omagh bombing, accusing former Army agent Kevin Fulton of providing dud intelligence on republican terrorism. In his first newspaper interview since the controversy began, the Chief Constable also revealed that information from the Garda in part led RUC Special Branch to dismiss a tip-off about a possible rocket and gun attack in Omagh 11 days before the Real IRA bomb which killed 29 men, women and children on 15 August, 1998.
And Flanagan accused the independent investigators used by the Police Ombudsman, Nuala O'Loan, to examine the RUC's handling of the Omagh bomb inquiry of having no experience in combating terrorism.
In his first newspaper interview since the Police Ombudsman's office accused him and senior commanders of 'defective leadership', Flanagan apologised for saying he would publicly commit suicide if allegations of incompetence had been true.
'I do, I do because it was an emotive statement that I wish I hadn't made. There is nothing more precious than life, but it is illustrative of how deeply I felt about this, how deeply unfair I felt the approach to this investigation was, how flawed it was and how grievously wronged I felt. But it is a remark none the less I regret having made.'
O'Loan provoked a storm of controversy last week after her report claimed the RUC's leadership had let down the Omagh victims and their families. The central plank of the Ombudsman's report is that the police may have had prior warning of an attack on Omagh but failed to act.
There are references to two tip-offs: one from an anonymous caller on 4 August that there was going to be a gun and rocket attack in the area; the second just four days before the bombing from an informant claiming the Real IRA was about to move a bomb from the republic into Northern Ireland.
Flanagan said the first call, which said two Kalashnikov rifles and a rocket grenade launcher were to be used against police officers, did not indicate that there was ever going to be a bomb. He said he was absolutely confident the four men allegedly involved in the rocket and gun attack, named in the Ombudsman's report as C, D, E, and F had no paramilitary connections.
He revealed for the first time that Mr E, who was simply given a nickname by the caller, was checked by RUC Special Branch and the Garda Siochana.
He said he was confident the Garda could confirm that they ruled out Mr E as having involvement in terrorism. The RUC Special Branch officers who checked with the Garda were never called to give evidence to the Police Ombudsman's investigators.
Flanagan rebutted evidence from 'Kevin Fulton' about a possible bomb attack on Northern Ireland in and around the Omagh massacre.
'Since the mid-1990s his [Fulton's] access to terrorist organisations was extremely limited. Any intelligence he was able to offer thereafter would have been in the criminal field. In terms of terrorism, one has to say his intelligence has the highest degree of unreliability.'
Copyright © 2001 Observer
NIO ignored Stobie's pleas for help
By Ed Moloney, Sunday Tribune
In the fortnight before his killing at the hands of a UDA gunman, the Northern Ireland Office twice ignored requests from William Stobie to be included in the government's Key Person's Protection Scheme which gives practical and financial aid to those whose lives are thought to be at risk of paramilitary attack. The former UDA Quarter-Master and Special Branch agent was shot dead outside his north Belfast home early last Wednesday morning, just nine days after he made his last request to be included in the scheme.
According to sources close to the story, Stobie's lawyers first wrote to the NIO asking that he be allowed to join the protection programme on November 28th, just after his trial for the murders of Belfast lawyer Pat Finucane and Protestant civilian, Adam Lambert collapsed.
His lawyers again wrote to the NIO on December 3rd, a day after detectives from Tennant Street police station visited Stobie to tell him of a specific death threat and just over a week before he was killed. This time the letter requested urgent action by the government on the grounds that the threat was now very real and was known to the Police Service.
In neither case did the NIO reply or even acknowledge receipt of the letters. A spokesman told The Sunday Tribune that "there is a long-standing practice that the Northern Ireland Office never comments on individual applications under the Key Persons Protection Scheme. It is a confidential matter between the applicant and the NIO." The spokesman added that the NIO was not in a position to make any comment in relation to Stobie notwithstanding the fact that he was now dead.
Under the terms of the Key Persons Protection Scheme (KPPS) those under threat can be given a range of assistance and advice. Approval by the KPPS could mean, for instance, that a gun licence can be speedily and more easily arranged and training given in the use of the weapon and in ways of countering armed assailants.
Some people may qualify for extensive and expensive changes to their homes, ranging from the fitting of bullet-proof windows, light sensitive alarms and panic buttons which instantly relay an alarm to the nearest police station. Those under threat may also qualify to be re-housed and in Stobie's case that would - and some would argue should - have been the immediate action to take.
It has not been unknown for politicians and prominent individuals in business and the professions to get almost instant assistance from the KPPS but someone in the NIO clearly thought that not only did William Stobie not fall into this category but that the former paramilitary - whose allegations that he tipped off the Special Branch about Pat Finucane's death greatly embarrassed the authorities - did not even merit a reply to his pleas for help..
Copyright © 2001 Sunday Tribune
The man who knew too much
Maol Muire Tynan Dublin, Ireland
Publicly the Red Hand Defenders -- a cover name for the UDA -- claimed responsibility for the murder of Special Branch informer William Alfred Stobie last week.
But many loyalists and nationalists doubt that loyalists alone were responsible for getting rid of a man who had shone a little light on some of the grimier operations of the North's military and police intelligence.
It was not Stobie's killing that caused surprise -- but the fact that he had survived so long. His assassins could have struck at any time during the 18 months he was on bail awaiting trial for aiding and abetting the murder of Belfast solicitor Pat Finucane.
If the UDA was intent on disposing of Stobie for "crimes against the loyalist people", its killers had easy access to him on their home patch where he lived in North Belfast. Instead the gunmen waited until after the trial collapsed. Why?
Perhaps a clue lies in Stobie's call, after his acquittal, for a judicial inquiry into the Finucane murder. Was he willing to say more than he had already revealed?
Suspicions are rife that this statement sealed his fate, rather than a sudden urge by the Red Hand Commanders to wreak revenge on him for his days as a police informer.
In spite of the obvious personal hazards involved in revealing some of his involvement with the RUC Special Branch, Stobie believed he was somehow proofed against attack by informing two journalists -- Ed Moloney and Neill Mulholland -- about his connection to the solicitor's assassination. His confidence was misplaced.
Even after the collapse of the trial for aiding and abetting Finucane's murder and the subsequent police warning that he might be under threat, Stobie continued to live with his girlfriend, Lorraine, in a flat in North Belfast's Forthriver Estate.
He survived an attack on his life more than six years ago and was apparently reassured by pledges from the local UDA bosses that his safety was now guaranteed.
North Belfast loyalists say he associated with few people in the area, though his family lived nearby, and led a quiet life.
Unlikely as it may seem, local people last week expressed surprise that he lived among them. He got up early to drive his partner to work. His killer approached him at 6am on Wednesday to dispatch the man who talked too much and hinted that he might talk some more.
So who killed William Stobie? Who gained most from his death? Who were the forces behind the trigger-man? And was it pure coincidence that his killing occurred the day the North's police ombudsman published her report on the Omagh bombing?
The most immediate impact of his departure is the undermining of any possibility of a public inquiry into the Finucane case.
His killers silenced the most crucial witness in such an inquiry and diminished the chances of providing information about the links between the RUC and the solicitor's murder in 1989.
Paul Mageean, legal officer with the Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ), said after last week's killing: "Public confidence is unlikely to be secured by an unsupervised police investigation into the Stobie murder."
The way in which Stobie was handled at official level had already rocked public confidence in the North's criminal justice system.
In January 1991, the DPP offered no evidence against Stobie in relation to arms charges. The decision of the DPP was regarded as quite remarkable, since the weapons were found by police in the roof space of Stobie's flat. His defence was that he did not know who put them there, though such a defence had proved fruitless for others in the past.
It has been reported that, during that case, Stobie threatened to expose publicly what he knew about the Finucane murder. The trial was aborted after a police officer, during evidence, mistakenly referred to Stobie's criminal record.
The CAJ later attempted to establish why the arms charges were withdrawn, but was informed by the DPP that the matter was sub judice and it would not be proper to reply to such an inquiry.
Despite Stobie's admission of his role in the Finucane murder -- he supplied weapons to the gunmen and recovered them after the killing -- he was not charged with the offence in 1991.
The decision not to press charges emerged a week before the arms charges were dropped.
A file relating to the Finucane killing was sent to the DPP at the time but, according to the Crown, it was decided there was insufficient evidence against Stobie. Attempts to establish why the DPP acted in such a fashion failed to elicit any reply.
Meanwhile, Stobie continued to live in Belfast and survived a UDA attack on his life. Thereafter, he was left alone until his arrest by the Stevens inquiry two years ago.
Following the charging of Stobie on June 23, 1999, his solicitor Joe Rice told the court that his client was a "paid Crown agent" from 1987 until 1990 and that he gave the police information, which was not acted on, in relation to a forthcoming killing being planned by loyalists.
Those pressing for a public inquiry into the death of Finucane and others insist that there is still enough material to allow a probe to proceed. They argue that police interview notes, statements by Stobie to his lawyers, his interviews with journalists and evidence from the case of another agent of military intelligence, Brian Nelson, could all be used to get to the root of the Finucane killing.
But Stobie's font of knowledge about the murky world of collusion between security forces and loyalist paramilitaries has finally dried up. His killing is a warning to others that there is a big price to paid for talking.
Copyright © 2001 Sunday Business Post, Ireland